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VOLUME 8 SUMMER 1963 NUMBER 4
A RE-EVALUATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGEt
(Part II)tt
JAMES A. GARDNERtt'
IV
IDEALS AND VALUES AND A PROPER RATIONALE
N O SMALL PART of the value of the law as the politically ordered
rules of social control lies in the respect for law which the people
must maintain in their own feelings and attitudes in democratic society.
Lord Denning has referred to this point in the following passage:
The lawyers assume that the law is an end in itself. They regard
law as a series of commands issued by a sovereign telling the
people what to do or what not to do; or they regard it as a piece
of social engineering designed to keep the community running
smoothly and in good order. Lawyers with this case of thought
draw a clear and absolute line between law and morals; or what
is nearly the same thing, between law and justice .... This is a
great mistake. It overlooks the reason why people obey the law.
The people of England do not obey the law simply because
they are commanded to do so: nor because they are afraid of
sanctions or of being punished. They obey the law because
they know it is a thing they ought to do. There are of course
t This paper was originally written in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Laws in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University, J. S. D.
Program, 1957-58. It has since been revised.
ft Part I has appeared in Volume VIII, Number 3.
ttt LL.B., Harvard, 1948; LL.M., Columbia, 1958; member of the Bar of
California and the Bar of Illinois; Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of
Law, 1956-57; Harlan F. Stone Fellow, Columbia University Law School, 1957-58;
now of the Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C.
This paper was written prior to the author's employment by the Department of
the Treasury. Nothing contained herein necessarily represents the views of the
Treasury Department.
(447)
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some wicked persons who do not recognize it as their duty to
obey the law: and for them sanctions and punishments must be
inflicted. But this does not alter the fact that the great majority
of the people obey the law simply because they recognize that
they are under a duty to obey it. . . . People will respect rules
of law which are intrinsically right and just and will expect their
neighbors to obey them, as well as obeying the rules themselves:
but they will not feel the same about rules which are unrighteous
or unjust. If people are to feel a sense of obligation to the law,
then the law must correspond with what they consider to be right
and just, or, at any rate, must not unduly diverge from it. In
other words, it must correspond, as near as may be, with justice.'85
The privileges are a part of the law and are identified with the
law by the populace. If the privileges did not exist, to such extent as
the problems heretofore mentioned in the absence of the privilege should
arise, such problems would tend to leave the public with a sense of in-
justice and thus would tend to bring disrepute on the law. The presence
of the privileges tends to preserve the respect for law which would
otherwise be diminished. Hence, no small part of the value of the
privileges lies, at least indirectly, in the respect for law which the people
must maintain in their own feelings and attitudes toward law in a
democratic society.' 86
This respect for law is not only grounded in the practical con-
siderations heretofore discussed but also in our ideals. Men tend to
equate the law in accordance with their legal ideals, and in this idealism
they must not be permitted to become disillusioned. Rigid adherence
to the most efficient means, in areas dealing with human ideals but
subject to the weaknesses that flesh is heir to, could tend to have such
an unwanted result. Though eighteenth century ideals have not been
realized, though man has fallen short of the hopes and plans of eigh-
teenth century optimism, much of value has been accomplished, and
many of the tasks that were begun remain to be worked over and
consolidated through the use of reason and experience of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, against the background of the ideals
of the twentieth century which are now coming to realize them-
selves. Among these tasks is the rewriting of our law of evidence.
Here, one of the most important questions immediately facing us is
what should be the position of the privileges in this modernized
system of evidentiary proof. Here, the question of ideals and values
must be considered no less than practical problems. One such ideal
185. DZNNING, Tim ROAD TO JusTIct 2, 3 (1955).
186. As Dean Pound might put it, law must be backed by a social-psychological
guarantee. POUND, TH4 TASK OF LAW 87 (1943) ; and see also id. 79-85
448 [VOL. 8: p. 447
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is that which makes for the greatest accuracy in fact-finding. Yet,
there are competing values in the form of ideals which visualize the
protection of the confidential nature of certain close, personal relation-
ships. Since the ideals are on different levels, it is difficult to weigh
them against each other, but it can be done, and the easiest way to do
it is by reducing each component to the level of a social interest.'
When this is done, the personal privileges, as important interests of
personality, appear more important in a narrow area than the value of
the highest degree of efficiency in the trial of facts, especially when
such efficiency is reduced on the average only to an imperceptible degree.
Yet these interests of personality can be better defined, evaluated, pro-
tected, developed, and delimited if they can be subsumed under a larger
premise. We will seek such a major premise in the hope that it will
enable us to test our legal principles by the more ultimate teleological
ideals of the end or purpose of law in our society - for, after all, trial
efficiency is only an instrumental value.188 Interests of personality are
on a higher level - yet, to what star can they be hitched? The social
interest in the individual life189 cuts both ways. However, if the essen-
tial values on both sides of the ledger sheet can be preserved, the result
will be a happy compromise.
The inarticulate major premise' 90 may be such that it cannot
readily be put into words, such that it has never or seldom been
called to mind,1"' but the writer will endeavor to set it forth in the
remaining pages of this section. People have long understood it intu-
187. See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. Rev. 1, 2. (1943)
(hereinafter cited as Survey).
188. The writer will assume here the ultimate value to be that of civilization,
in the Poundian sense, as that which makes for the raising of the powers of the
individual to their highest peak through the conquest of nature, both internal and
external. Hence, the end of law is civilization, and this is best promoted in a mature
culture by the according of full recognition to the social interest in the individual
life. On this point, in addition to the various writings of Dean Pound, see generally
the following articles by the writer: The Supreme Court and Philosophy of Law,
5 VILL. L. REv. 181 (1959); The Sociological Jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, (2
pts.) 7 VIL. L. REv. 1, 165 (1961-62). See also text at notes 200, 215 post.
189. Survey 12.
190. Paraphrasing Holmes, in The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 466,
467, 469 (1897) : "Behind the logical form lies a judgment ...often an inarticulate
and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root of the whole proceeding."
He points out that "the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their
duty of weighing considerations of social advantage," the result of which is "to
leave the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate and often unconscious.
• .. Still it is true that a body of law is more rational and more civilized when
every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it
subserves, and when the grounds for deserving that end are stated or are ready to
be stated in words."
191. Thus, Holmes, J., urging judicial restraint in reviewing decisions of lay
administrators, in C.B. & Q.R. Co. v. Babcock, 294 U.S. 585, 598 (1907), spoke of
"an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed
tangled expressions. . ..
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itively, without necessarily being able to rationalize and articulate it.'92
In fact, rationalization has thus far failed. The privileges are a part
of our Anglo-American heritage, our thought-ways, our social and
moral ethos. And this heritage from the past is augmented by new
ideals in the light of the crisis and aspirations of the twentieth cen-
tury.'93 That such ideals have long been with us as abstract ideals
cannot be denied, but they have been given a more prominent place in
the scheme of values in this century, particularly in the realization of
rights based thereon, than they have heretofore actually occupied. For
example, the privileges recognize an aspect of the value of personality
in the area of individual freedom and privacy, rather than in the area
of security of possessions and transactions (property and contract
rights). This actualizing of a new basis for the recognition of the
personal privileges can be seen in the receding emphasis on the rights
of property and the increased emphasis on the more intangible personal
rights throughout the law. For example, the legal recognition of the
intangible aspects of the rights of personality tends to make the per-
sonal privileges substantive rights within themselves rather than pro-
cedural rights for the securing of the substantive rights of property and
contract, and this view may be gaining recognition. The following
quotation is a further recognition of this change:
Toward the end of the nineteenth century a tendency became
manifest throughout the world to depart radically from funda-
mental ideas which had governed the maturity of legal systems.
In 1891, Jhering formulated it thus: 'Formerly high valuing of
property, lower valuing of the person. Now lower valuing of
property, higher valuing of the person.' He went on to say that
the line of legal growth was, 'weakening of the sense of property,
strengthening of the feeling of dignity (Ehre)'. This states the
matter well if by Ehre we understand the idea of the moral and
so legal worth of the concrete human individual,oa
Dean Pound has written of the "balancing of interests," giving
us a guide to weigh the competing values in our society. He has shown
us that the conflicting principles in competition for the mastery19 4 must
192. On intuitive understanding generally, see CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
193. See, for example, SOROKIN, THE CRISIS OV OUR AGE (1941); SOROKIN,
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF HUMANITY (1949) ; LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEw
KEY (3d ed. 1957).
The writer uses the term "new" here in the sense of meaning ideals which are
now beginning to realize themselves as contradistinguished from ideals such as those
of the Greek stoics, which remained faraway visions, longed for, but impossible of
concrete attainment for the civilization of the time and place.
193a. POUND, TIHE IDEAL ELEMENT IN LAW 118-19 (1958).
194. Paraphrasing CARDOZO, op. cit. note 192, 40-41.
[VOL. 8: p. 447 .
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be reduced to the common denominator of social interests and balanced
in the light of "reason and experience. "'195 And the late Justice Cardozo
has pointed out that just as a judge cannot decide a case by any set
formula, so one cannot balance interests in the neat and easy manner
of Justice Roberts in the constitutional law area. 9 Interests can only
be balanced by a consideration of all of life itself.'97 That is, in a sense,
the lesson of Charles F. Curtis's brilliant essay on The Ethics of
Advocacy,' and that is the thesis of the writer as to the rationale of
the personal privileges in Anglo-American law. The end of law is
justice. Justice has been defined as giving to every man his due and
as the ordering of an ideal relation among men.' 99 Yet, in recent times,
a broader vision of justice has been set forth as that which considers
the entire picture, the totality of competing social interests, as that
which makes for civilization, that which raises the powers of mankind
to their highest pitch for the civilization of the time and place.2 0 Courts
have always struggled to achieve justice, ignoring truth at times, when
the state of development of the law did not permit them to reach the
desired result by the generally presupposed route of truth. Thus, our
law has a long history of resort to legal fictions to achieve the desired
result. Professor Wu has commented on the matter as follows:
• ..practical reason being the soul of the law, its essential func-
tion is to serve the ends of justice. Where the law looks for the
truth, it is for the purpose of rendering justice. Where it seems
to disregard truth, it is also for the purpose of rendering justice.
• . .Law is the measure while the facts are the things to be
measured. In other words, although justice is based upon truth,
truth alone does not constitute justice. Only on a higher plane
can we assert that justice and truth are one. On the human plane,
they are inter-related, but do not fuse into a unity. This does not
mean that justice is unreal or untrue. It is real and true, but not
195. See note 37, ante. For a succinct statement of Dean Pound's legal philosophy,
see MY PHILOSOPHY Op LAW 249-69 (Rosenwald Foundation 1941). On the balancing
of interests, see Pound, Survey passim.
196. "When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has
only one duty - to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the
statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former."
Roberts, J., in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
197. CARDOZO, op. cit. note 192, 112. "If you ask how he [the judge] is to know
when one interest outweighs another, I can only answer that he must get his knowl-
edge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection, in brief,
from life itself."
198. Op. cit. note 161.
199. Cf. POUND, JUSTice AccoRDING TO LAW 2 et Ch. I passinu (1951). "In
different theories which have been urged justice has been regarded as an individual
virtue, or as a moral idea, or as a regime of social control, or as the end or purpose
of social control and so of law, or as the ideal relation among men which we seek
to promote and maintain in civilized society and toward which we direct social control
and law as the most specialized form of social control. Definitions of justice depend
upon which of these approaches is taken. Let us look at each of them." Id. 2.
200. See POUND, INTERPRETATIONS op LEGAL HISTORY 141-65 (1923).
5
Gardner: A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (Part II)
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
in the sense that it corresponds with empirical realities. It is real
and true in the sense that it corresponds with the reality of the
moral order .... 201
In her brilliant study of the oath, Professor Silving stated a principle
which is equally applicable to the personal privileges:
The democratic state must limit its claim to man's truth to in-
stances of clear superior interest, and it must yield that claim in
cases where disclosure of truth cannot be expected from the in-
dividual. Such cases include all those involving the accused or
the suspect, as well as all persons closely connected with them.
With or without oath, no man should be bound by law to make
disclosures which would cause him or persons close to him sub-
stantial harm. Man should be held by law to average law abidance,
not to the utmost self-sacrifice. 202
In relation to the individual lawsuit, Mr. Curtis has put it thus:
Justice is something larger and more intimate than truth. Truth
is only one of the ingredients of justice. Its whole is the satisfac-
tion of those concerned. It is to that end that each attorney must
say the best, and only the best of his own case.2 °2
In a famous and oft-quoted passage, the late Dean Wigmore set
out what he termed the "General Principle of Privileged Communica-
tions." He held that there are four fundamental conditions which must
be predicated as necessary to the establishment of a privilege, to wit:
The relationship must originate in confidence; the confidentiality must
be essential to the relationship of the parties; it must be a relationship
which deserves the protection of the community (that is, "ought to be
sedulously fostered"), and, finally:
The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation. 3
The fourth condition is the one which might be described as of "cul-
minating importance," and it may be restated as essentially the balanc-
ing of the opposing interests involved. This was well put in a recent
201. Wu, John C. H., Truth and Fiction in the Art of Justice, 36 U. DE'r. L. J.
130, 137, 141 (1958).
202. Silving, The Oath: II, 68 YALE L. J. 1527, 1577 (1959). See also id. 1574-77,
where Miss Silving discusses the subject of "human dignity."
202a. Curtis, op. cit. note 161, 12.
203. VIII WIGMOR8 § 2285. These criteria are criticized in Functional Overlap
1229-31. The writer believes, however, thit the objections raised by the Comment on
page 1230 thereof are not really sound because they are the mere "details" which
Wigmore himself considered in connection with the evaluation of the privilege. The
writer has also endeavored to consider all aspects of the question in the present
evaluation. They can all be subsumed under Wigmore's four categories when these
are broken down (as the Comment breaks them down).
[VOL. 8: p. 447
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case decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, where the difficult
balance between full disclosure and privileged communication was struck
by the court:
Throughout their judicial endeavors courts seek truth and
justice and their search is aided significantly by the fundamental
principle of full disclosure. When that principle conflicts with the
attorney-client privilege it must, of course, give way but only to
the extent necessary to vindicate the privilege and its underlying
purposes. The matter iE truly one of balance. "°4
Yet, as has been pointed out, the interests may be balanced only from
an understanding of life itself. 2 5 This means that to a considerable ex-
tent the importance that one will attach to the privileges, when weighed
against the need for evidence, will depend to a substantial degree on
his understanding of the problem of evidentiary proof as integrated with
his attitude toward social values generally.
The result is that one who puts greater emphasis upon the impor-
tance of full disclosure ot all available evidence, so that a verdict will be
more accurate, will tcnd to disapprove the privileges and to favor their
abolition or at least their restriction within narrow limits. Teachers
of evidence who are able masters of their specialty are likely to be found
in this category. '0 Thus, Professors Morgan and Maguire, writing
in 1937, lamented that "Almost nothing has been done to limit the
privilege of suppressing the truth."2 7 They advocated the construction
of a well-designed code upon the principle previously urged by Thayer,
namely, that nothing shall be received in evidence which is not logically
probative of soire issue of fact; and that everything which is logically
probative of somic issue of fact should be admitted unless excluded on
some clear gronnd of policy.2"' Elsewhere, Professor Morgan has indi-
cated that he would admit all relevant evidence except that which is
too rcinote, confusing, time consuming, or unduly prejudicial." 0
Practitioners of the law and those who work in the regular social
sciences are likely to consider the personal element and the broader
sncial values as more important in the over-all picture than mere tech-
nical accuracy in fact-finding and hence to hold with the late Mr. Curtis
that "Justice is something larger and more intimate than truth."2"2
214. In re Richardson, 31 N. J. 391, 157 A. 2d 695, 701 (1960).
205. See text at note 197, and note 197 ante.
206. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privilege in Federal
Courts Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 108-10 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Louisell].
207. Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50
HARV. L. Rev. 909, 910 (1937).
208. Id. 923, citing THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 530 (1898).
209. Loc. cit. note 102, ante; see also op. cit. note 28, ante, 22 et seq.; Mc-
CORMICK Ch. 16; VI WIGMORE § 1864.
210. Curtis, op. cit. note 161, 12.
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The writer has found that the practitioners almost to a man favor the
privileges, and they tend to favor broad constructions of the rules of
privilege.2 11 It should be noted that they generally assume the privilege
to be much broader than it actually is. In fact, there is a tendency for
lawyers not versed in the technicalities of the law of attorney-client
privilege to assume that it covers all preparatory materials in the pos-
session of a party's counsel. Furthermore, even when they have become
aware of the more narrow boundaries of the privilege, they very much
dislike to have to call the opposing attorney as a witness and will not
do so if it can possibly be avoided. They will frequently go to great
trouble to obtain their proof from other sources, and on matters not
clearly important to their cases they will often forego the right of
cross-examination of opposing counsel, even when they believe that to
call him to the witness stand would improve their position.
The professional attitude of lawyers toward the privilege is re-
flected in the substantial amount of attention which has been devoted
to the subject by the various bar associations in the present century.
Generally, no special benefit has come from such professional consid-
eration, as the predestined conclusion has been an invariable tendency
to reaffirm a blanket approval of the privilege, often with a broadening
of its coverage. More critical analysis of the privilege in today's world,
however, is not the task of the organized bar. That is the task of the
jurist and teacher. Nevertheless, the attitude of the organized bar and
the attitude of scholars from other socially oriented disciplines is
entitled to some weight.
The American Bar Association took a stand in favor of a broad
interpretation of the attorney-client privilege in its amicus curiae brief
filed in Hickman v. Taylor,212 while the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules had proposed amending Rule 30 (b) as early as 1942.213
Within the writer's personal experience, the State Bar of California
has in recent years taken an active interest in preserving the privilege
in California in its present broad form.2 14 In the wake of recent wire-
211. This statement is based 'on general discussion of the problem with lawyers
over a long period of time. But see De Parcq, op. cit. note 119. In tile same
symposium, defense counsel criticized only tile physician-patient privilege; Geer, The
Uniformi'Rules of Evidcnce: A Defendant's View, 40 MINN. L. REv. 347, 356 (1956).
212. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
213. See 4 MoollE f" 23.26 [61 1124-27.
214. Much has been written on the subject of privilege and discovery in the
STArE BAR JOURNAL OF CAIIFORNIA in recent years. A very recent article urging
retrenchment is Pruitt, Lawycr's Work Product, 37 CALIF. B. J. 228 (1962). The
article is severely critical of the position taken by tile Supreme Court of California
in the great American case on discovery, Greyhound v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d
355, 364 P. 2d 266 (1961), and companion cases. This article urges the legislative
adoption of tile federal work product rule, which if liberally construed would give
California the broad coverage which the English rules of quasi-privilege accord.
Much of this opposition to open discovery has come from the delelse bar, which is
strong in California. For a good example, see the treatment of privilege and dis-
[VOL. 8: p. 447
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tapping experiences, the New York Bar has undertaken new activities
to prevent the frustration of the privilege in its most important area,
the face to face situation."5 Today, the social scientists are devoting
some of their attention to the study of law, and the area of confiden-
tiality is proving to be of interest to them, especially to those who are
working in such disciplines as psychology and sociology. These scholars
tend to favor the preservation of the personal privileges. The writer
has discussed the matter with a distinguished professor of sociology.
Speaking on the basis of recent developments in psychology and social
relations, this professor has advised the writer that the privileges are
of social value and should be retained. He feels that the confidentiality
which they afford is important for a free and easy personal relationship
in the protected areas and that this is of some value in the practice of
law but more especially in the practice of medicine, where there are
higher values at stake than mere monetary damages. 1 However, the
writer must point out that these higher values are also present in those
legal situations where the personal element predominates.
Professor Louisell has probably written more ably and extensively
on the subject of privilege than any other legal scholar in the common
law world. His views therefore deserve to be considered at some length
and are entitled to great respect. Professor Louisell maintains that
"the historic privileges of confidential communication protect significant
human values in the interest of the holders of the privileges, and that
the fact that the existence of these guarantees sometimes results in the
exclusion from a trial of probative evidence is merely a secondary and
incidental feature of the privileges' vitality."2 7  The privileges are
widely accepted in European legal thought and western society gener-
ally. "In European legal thought emphasis is placed upon the moral
importance of refraining from coercion of witnesses in matters of
conscience; such coercion in the face of conflicting concepts of loyalty
and duty, is considered to put witnesses in an intolerable position,
resulting as to some in the likelihood of perjury ... ."2i Professor
Louisell observes that the privileges of husband and wife, attorney
and client, priest and penitent, and physician and patient "are deeply
rooted in our political and social fabric, as they are in the mores
covery in I STANBURY, CALIFORNIA TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE (1958), written
by a distinguished defense trial lawyer.
215. See text at notes 369-72, 376 post.
216. Professor William J. Goode, Department of Sociology, Columbia University,
to the writer in a personal conference at Columbia University, Spring Term, 1958.
Quoted with permission. See also Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's World, 41
MINN. L. REv. 731, 737 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Psychologist].
217. Louisell 101.
218. Ibid.
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and ethos of at least western society." '19 Western Europe considers
them of value to accurate fact-finding in that they help avoid perjury,
whereas the Anglo-American analysis proceeds on the premise that they
are a hinderance to accurate fact-finding.22 The writer would comment
that this latter analysis, probably stemming from Bentham, has been
fostered since Bentham's time by the scholarly writers on evidence,
particularly the teachers of evidence in the American university law
schools. Professor Louisell assumes that the privileges may result in
some loss of information to opposing counsel and ultimately to the trier
of fact, but he nevertheless maintains that this loss of evidence is not so
important on the debit side of the ledger as the positive values which
the privilege affords:
[T]here are things more important to human liberty than accurate
adjudication. One of them is the right to be left by the state un-
molested in certain human relations. At least, there is no violence
to history, logic or common sense in a legislative judgment to
that effect. It is the historic judgment of the common law, as it
apparently is of European law and is generally in western society,
that whatever handicapping of the adjudicatory process is caused
by recognition of the privileges, it is not too great a price to pay
for secrecy in certain communicative relations . .2."
The number of these relationships are few, however, and the area of
protection accorded in each one is small:
Primarily they are a right to be let alone, a right to unfettered
freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relationships, from the
state's coercive or supervisory powers and from the nuisance of
its eavesdropping .... 222
This right to be left alone is a part of the value which men call
freedom, which in turn is a part of that more comprehensive value con-
cept toward which we are moving and which we are here struggling to
articulate - even as our society is struggling to realize it. True free-
dom might be defined as the ability to do what one wills when he wills
it. This, however, is an illusion, because it does not and cannot exist.
The abstract concept ignores the conflicting desires of the individual
personality, the demands of the primary group, the conflicting demands
of the numerous groups that affect a person's life, the countervailing
pull of diverse responsibilities, the sense of duty to the loved ones, and
219. Id. 108.
220. Id. 110.
221. Ibid.; and Professor McCormick recognizes that the disclosure of marital
and professional confidences can "needlessly shock our feelings of delicacy." Mc-
CoRm IcK 166.
222. Louisell 110-11 ; see also Psychologist 743, 744.
[VOL. 8: p. 447
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 4 [1963], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss4/1
SUMMER 1963] ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
the sense of obligation to society.223 Yet, freedom in the narrower sense
of the right to be let alone, a part of that broader value of freedom in
the socio-political sense, as the right to have some choice in one's work
in life, one's mobility in space, and, at least theoretically, in the form
of one's government, is an element in the recognition of the personal
privileges. The relationship of the individual man to the problem of
freedom in general is specifically applicable in the resolution of the
place of the privileges in the law of evidence. That point is well made
in the lines quoted at the beginning of this essay - there, from the
standpoint of striking the proper balance. It is pointed up also in the
following passage on freedom - here, from the standpoint of main-
taining a responsible freedom by a ceaseless struggle (which seems to
inhere in the nature of man) :
The struggle to be free is inherent in the human predicament
and is unique to man. The other animals have problems, but they
do not have the problems of the integrity of the self-conscious
individual who must always feel the tensions set up by the relation-
ships between self and society. Since it is inherent in his predica-
ment, the problem of freedom is never fully solved. Being both
social and individual in his requirements and being self-conscious
about both, man finds himself in an unending emotional crisis.
Freedom is not something which can be purchased once and for
all. It is not a matter in which there is any easy security. The
human situation is such that we have neither security nor simplicity
of defense .... 22 4
To such extent as freedom is an important value, to that extent the
privileges must be considered in connection with the balancing of free-
dom and responsibility as a part of the right of choice against the
opposing need of the state for efficiency in the administration of justice
in the more technical sense.
By the same reasoning, this general sense of freedom coincides
with (and is reinforced by) other values which are a part of the overall
framework of man's life in society. One of these values lies in the
desire to be free of the sense of treachery. Another lies in the felt need
to be free in the sense of having some degree of discretion in an area
where the circumstances disclose a case that is not clear-cut (i.e.,
neither black nor white).
223. Professor Sorokin to his class in sociology (Society, Culture and Person-
ality), Harvard University, Fall Term, 1947, the writer being present. And see
SOROKIN, SOCIETY CULTURE AND PERSONALITY 469-78 (1947). "An individual is free
when he can satisfy all his desires by the means at his disposal. If the sum total of
his desires exceeds the sum total of the means for their satisfaction, lie is unfree."
Id. 469.224. TRUEBI.OOD, DECLARATION OF FREEDOM 45 (1955); cf. id: Ch. V (The
Dignity of the Individual).
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Both Wigmore and Louisell have deemed the sense of treachery
to be important, and Radin recognized it as controlling when he justi-
fied the privilege on the basis of loyalty and the sense of honor. Louisell
points out Dean Wigmore's answer to Bentham, emphasizing the sense
of treachery, the belief that no man of elevated mind would stoop to the
occupation of legal counselling if required to disclose his client's con-
fidences, the appearance of inconsistency which the occupation of such
a conflicting position would create, and the importance of peace of mind
to counsel. He reminds us that even Bentham recognized the priest-
penitent privilege as a necessary concomitant to religious freedom.2 5
He makes the following observation on the marital privileges:
A marriage without the right of complete privacy of communica-
tion would necessarily be an imperfect union. Utter freedom of
marital communication from all government supervision, con-
straint, control or observation, save only when the communica-
tions are for an illegal purpose, is a psychological necessity for
the perfect fulfillment of marriage . .2
Louisell urges precise analysis and investigation and inquiry "into the
true nature and psychological, social, historical and moral importance
to human freedom of claims to privilege" in order to best separate the
genuine from the spurious; and he believes that the present "hodge-
podge treatment" of the privileges, which lumps them all in a class with
the exclusionary rules generally, has resulted in much confusion, making
the privileges a matter of status, the cause of professional pride and
jealousy that has resulted in the spawning of new and spurious privi-
leges. 27 He feels that Wigmore has contributed to the confusion by
his insistence on a strict utilitarian basis for the privileges,228 and he
refers to Professor Morgan's "telling attack on the Wigmore thesis." 2 9
Professor Louisell has set out what the writer believes to be the
soundest evaluation of the place of the privileges in the law of evidence
today. Louisell recognizes that the really important privileges are
those of husband and wife, attorney and client, priest and penitent, and,
225. Louisell, 112, 113.
226. Id. 113. There are actually two such confidential privileges: (1) The
privilege not to have disclosed confidential communications between the husband and
wife; and (2) the privilege of a spouse not to have the other spouse testify against
him. See VIII WIGMORE §§ 2332-41, 2227-45.
227. Louisell 114-15.
228. Id. 111. Professor Louisell believes that Wigmore's thesis, justifying the
privilege as promoting free consultation, is not the chief reason why the privilege
should be accorded legal recognition. Rather, it is the sense of treachery argument
which Wigmore makes in answer to Bentham (VIII WIGMOR9 § 2291 at 557). Here,
Louisell quotes from Bacon's Essays, XX, Of Counsel, as to the partial confidences
which men put in others, but in their counsellors, "they commit the whole: By how
much the more, they are obliged to all Faith and integrity." (Louisell 111-13.) To
compel counsel to disclose these confidences would pervert the function of counselling.
229. Louisell 112.
[VOL. 8: p. 447
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 4 [1963], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss4/1
SUMMER 1963] ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
to a lesser extent, physician and patient.2 3 ° The whole tenor of his
article (supported by important passages in particular) is to the effect
that the privileges are more than mere procedural rules of exclusion 23'
and are actually substantive rights, the infringement of which would be
manifestly unfair even in those areas where the courts have the dis-
cretionary power to remove the immunity. He states that in the federal
courts today much confusion exists as a result of the failure of the
bench and bar to understand the true nature of the privileges. He
urges that:
[T]here are things more important to human liberty than accurate
adjudication. One of them is the right to be left by the state
unmolested in certain human relations. At least, there is not
violence to history, logic or common sense in a legislative judg-
ment to that effect. It is the historic judgment of the common
law, as it apparently is of European law and is generally in western
society, that whatever handicapping of the adjudicatory process
is caused by recognition of the privileges, it is not too great a
price to pay for secrecy in certain communicative relations
husband-wife, client-attorney, and penitent-clergyman.232
Vhile recognizing "the social importance of accurate fact finding,"
Louisell prefers "the significance to human freedom of well based priv-
ileges of confidential communications." 3  Nevertheless, he realizes that
there is no absolute or final answer:
Ultimately, the evaluation of the social and moral importance
to human freedom of any confidential communication privilege, in
relation to the significance at a trial of foreclosing ascertainment
of the full facts, involves value judgments, the testing of which,
so far as known to this writer, is presently subject to no scientific
technique.2 34
However, we are not left without hope of a better answer in the future.
This ,vill require new insights, based upon experience and scholarly
analysis. The rationale of the privileges and their proper place in the
law of evidence must receive much further study in the scholastic world:
{The problem] cannot be definitively settled until (1) the exper-
ience of all the great traditions of the legal world. East as well as
West, on the problem of confidentiality are thoroughly analyzed
230. Id. 107-08.
231. Id. 110-11, 118, 120-23.
232. Id. 110.
233. Psychologist 749.
234. Id. 750. Dean Pound has dealt with this problem of evaluating different
interests of society through the judicial process in a most penetrating manner. A
good example is his CONTEMPORARY JURISTIc TnEORY 57-58 (1940). The writer
submits that Pound's studies point to the same conclusion that Professor Louisell has
reached, namely, that the particular problem involves value judgments which at the
present stage of civilization cannot be scientifically tested.
459
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by some great scholar, or (2) psychoanalytic learning focuses
up[on] some additional rationales, or (3) perhaps some genius
of great spiritual insight into the realities of the human person-
ality, makes vivid to us the needs of the human mind and soul
in this area. 235
The history of Anglo-American law is proof that procedure is
the most important item in the preservation of our liberties. Without
effective procedures for the enforcement of substantive rights, such
rights become mere "preachments" or vague and ineffective ideals. 36
As Lord Denning has reminded us:
* . . the English law respecting the freedom of the individual has
been built upon the procedure of the Courts: and this simple in-
stance of priority in point of time contains within it the funda-
mental principle that, where there is any conflict between the
freedom of the individual and any other rights or interests, then
no matter how great or powerful these others may be, the freedom
of the humblest citizen shall prevail over it.23T
Moreover, the rule of law applies to all alike and in a general kind of
way which cannot take into account individuality. The uniqueness of
personality has led to a revulsion from the over-mechanization of justice
in the nineteenth century to the individualization of justice through ju-
dicial discretion in the twentieth century.2 38 The judges, however, can
move only by "molecular motions ' 239 and within the narrow confines
of judicial tradition and sanctioned practice. Individualized justice
must be justice according to law, and this necessarily requires rules,
doctrines, principles, and standards.240  "The standards of the law,"
wrote Holmes in The Common Law, "are standards of general appli-
cation. The law takes no account of the infinite varieties of tempera-
ment, intellect and education which makes the internal character of a
given act so different for different men. It does not attempt to see
men as God sees them. .... -"21 This is why, generally speaking, the
application of the rules of privilege should not be a matter of judicial
discretion. It would leave too much to "the luck of the draw" in an
area where the people need to feel reasonably secure and the lawyers
235. Letter from Professor David W. Louisell to the writer, December 3, 1959,
as qualified by letter of January 21, 1960, from Professor Louisell to the writer,
quoted with permission. And see text at note 281 et seq., post. Louisell 114-15
(emphasizing the importance of comparative study).
236. See POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 54-62 et passimn (1942);
POUND, NFw PATHS OF T'Hn LAW passim, esp. Ch. III and 56, 58 (1950).
237. DFNNING, FRESDOM UNDtR THi. LAW 4 (1949).
238. See POUND, LAW AND MORALS 54, 70 (2d ed. 1926).
239. See Holmes, J., in So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917).
240. See generally Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems
of Law, 7 TuL. L. Rnv. 475, 485 (1933).
241. HOLMES, Ting COMMON LAW 108 (1881).
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need to be able to know the answers in the course of their preparations
and in trial, in the rough and tumble of the combative adversary process.
Moreover, it is these "infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and
education," both in the people themselves and in the judges who ad-
minister the law, which have caused eminent jurists and scholars to
differ so strongly and sometimes ardently as to the proper place of the
privileges in the law of evidence. This is why there is no easy answer
to the problem, why it must be worked out in terms of a balancing of
the social interests which the state exists to protect.
Because personality is what it is, we can never know the ultimate
reality in relation to the privileges. Because of the antinomy between
liberty and government,242 we can never know just where to draw the
line as to that which the state should require one to produce and that
which it should declare to be in a category immune from production. As
Cardozo has elegantly put it in relation to the problems of jurisprudence
in general: "Antithesis permeates the structure. Here is the mystery
of the legal process, and here also is its lure. These unending paradoxes
tease us with the challenge of a riddle, the incitement of the chase. The
law, like science generally, if it could be followed to its roots, would
take us down beneath the veins and ridges to the unplumbed depths of
being, the reality behind the veil."24 The result is a public policy which
endeavors to meet the current needs of the community, "the highest
common factor of public sentiment and intelligence as ascertained by
the judges assisted by the bar"; but "not an ideal standard to which
the law ought to conform."244 Public policy is rarely up to ethical
standards and usually falls below such standards.245 A person is not
required to claim a privilege, and, in fact, the writer knows many people
who would scorn to do so, at least under ordinary circumstances,
though business generally has not reached that high plane of ethics,
and perhaps the vast majority of people, both laymen and lawyers, will
continue to use all of the available technicalities when it appears to
242. See CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT passim, esp. 181-83 (1948).
But there are those who hold that "There is no proper antagonism between the role
of society and that of the individual." While the man in the street thinks in terms
of such an antagonism as necessary, society is never a separate entity from those
who compose it. There are only differences of temperament among the individuals
who compose a culture. The problem of the individual is not clarified by stressing the
differences, but rather "by stressing their mutual reinforcement. This rapport is so
close that it is not possible to discuss patterns of culture without considering specifi-
cally their relation to individual psychology." BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 251-54(1934). Professor Corwin suggests that the notion of liberty against government
may be gradually eliminated under new social patterns in which man seeks self-
realization in cooperation and community endeavor rather than self-advancement and
self-exploitation. Corwin, op. cit. supra 182-83. See also POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL
THROUGH LAW 127 (1942).
243. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 134 (1928).
244. Winfield, Ethics in English Case Law, 45 HARV. L. REV. 112 (1931).
245. Id. 112.
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their interest to do so. Therefore, we have felt it necessary to show
that the law of privilege is inextricably intwined with a multitude of
variegated problems of grave and far-reaching personal and legal con-
sequences. However, these catch-phrase arguments and the related
illustrations merely serve to point up the problem. The rationale of the
privileges is contained in a trans-empirical value concept which justifies
numerous principles of law and ethics and rules of social control. The
privileges are only one series of components which can be subsumed
under this larger value postulate. Recognized generally since ancient
times, it is only now coming to be specifically recognized in the law in
the areas of our finer personal sensitivity. For our purposes, a state-
ment by Professor Lasswell seems to synthesize the postulate very well:
Our overmastering goal in interpersonal relationships may,
I think, be stated in terms of human dignity. I affirm my own goal
values in these terms, and conceive of the task of man as guiding
the processes of society toward the realization of human dignity
on the world scale in theory and fact. Among the component
values designated by the term 'human dignity,' I understand the
sharing of respect and affection. Respect is the deference that we
give and deserve in our capacity as human beings, and on the basis
of our individual merit. The presumption in favor of privacy
follows from our respect for freedom of choice, for autonomy, for
self-direction on the part of everyone. It is apparent, of course,
that the presumption on behalf of privacy is refutable when the
group, by democratic processes, decides that privacy is being used
in ways that result in the infliction of damage upon the members
of the group (including the individuals immediately involved), or
when the group decides that an emergency exists in which the
activities which are necessary to the survival of the whole, no
longer admit of the accustomed forms of privacy. 46
Professor McDougal has stated that "the most elementary considera-
tions of human dignity" require "that private choice will be respected
in the highest degree and that coercion shall not be applied to human
beings beyond common need." '247
As Holmes has pointed out, the growth of the law is logical in
theory, but in substance it is legislative: that is, the judges do not
merely follow precedents which have outlived their usefulness. "The
very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with
246. LASSWELL, The Threat to Privacy, in CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES 121, 139
(1952). See also The Canadian Bill of Rights, which is entitled An Act for the
Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Part I,
Sec. 3 (a), (c), (d), and (e) ; The United Nations DECLARATION Or HUmAN RIGHTS,
esp. Articles 10 and 11. The Canadian Bill of Rights is set out in 37 CAN. B. REv.
1-3 (1939). The principle of "human dignity" is well recognized in both of these
documents;
247. McDougal, Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity, Pro-
ceedings AM. Soc'Y INT'L. L. 107, 118 (1959).
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an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices
of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the
community concerned." And when old rules retain their vitality by
reason of new or continued utility, "new reasons more fitted to the time
have been found for them," and "they gradually receive a new content,
and at last a new form, from the grounds to which they have been
transplanted." Hitherto this process has been largely unconscious.2 4
The writer believes that this process has been at work in the case
of the privileges. They remain important to the twentieth century.
While they have a historical origin, they are not mere vestiges of the
past. In part they are a concession to the weakness of human nature,
but this is not the basis of their present justification. As the writer has
shown, there are practical considerations which are grounded in history,
human insecurity, the nature of our adversary system; and there are
idealistic reasons, which have their origin in the twentieth century belief
that justice is something larger and more intimate than truth, that the
social interest in the individual personality is an intrinsic value to be
protected and cultivated. Yet both the practical and the idealistic rea-
sons are inextricably intwined, and the idealistic reasons, in their effect
upon the attitudes toward the judicial system, also become practical
reasons. Nevertheless, it is this idealistic basis, which is coming to be
articulated as an actuality in the juristic comprehension, that can pro-
vide a sounder and more comprehensive rationale on which the privi-
leges as well as other personal-social values shall rest securely. We
choose to describe this rationale as the principle of human dignity.
The privileges deal with the concept of "human dignity" in its most
formal sense, before the courts of law and governmental agencies, in
matters of public record, often of unusual public interest. Yet the
principle which entitles them to recognition goes far beyond this im-
mediate sphere, to the outlook on life as a whole. In weighing the values
which inhere in "the scientific principle," as embodied in the recognized
need for evidence, on the one hand, contrasted with "the dignity prin-
ciple," on the other, we can perceive that the two principles are pulling
in opposite directions. One points toward the efficient and omnipotent
state and machine-like justice; the other, toward the individual's right
to privacy, toward his right to subjective freedom of thought in a
small but important sphere into which the omnipotent state cannot
intrude. Choices do make a difference, and here the contrast points up
the importance of the over-all problem. The difference might con-
ceivably be as great as that of the inherent fear which exists in the
police state, on the one hand, and the disordered state of Greek anarchy,
248. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (1881).
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on the other. Yet the proper compromise might well represent a com-
ponent of that general spirit of individual freedom which has been
felt and cherished in English-speaking countries for so long.24 9
V
A PROCEDURAL POSTULATE AND SOME APPLICATIONS
TO LIFE AND LAW
A. Formulation of a Jural Postulate:
Lord Acton spoke of liberty as "the delicate fruit of a mature
civilization." He defined liberty as "the assurance that every man shall
be protected in doing what he believes his duty against the influence
of authority and majorities, custom and opinion."25 ° Historical study
has shown a steadily widening process of respect for the integrity of
the individual from the days of the Greeks and the Romans to the pres-
ent time.251 The common law rights of Englishmen thrived and grew
on English soil, were transplanted to America, united with natural law
ideas from the Continent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
and became the natural rights of man. 25 2 Kent thought of the law as
a rule of freedom whereby each and every individual could do whatever
he might choose to do insofar as compatible with the freedom of each
and every other individual to do likewise, according to a universal
law.253 Hegel saw in history a process of evolution, a continual be-
coming from lesser to greater individual freedom, within the confines
of the state.254 Dean Pound has written brilliantly of the stages of legal
history and the ends of law in each stage. The result of his research
and interpretations shows the end or goal of law as an ever-widening
process working for the advancement of civilization through the im-
provement of the lot of the individual. Pound has classified legal his-
tory into five stages and has restated the ends of law for each of these
stages. The first stage is the primitive law, in which the end or purpose
of law is to keep the peace. The second stage is that of the strict law,
in which the end is certainty and uniformity in the ordering of society.
The third stage is that of equity and natural law, in which ideals of
249. For a frame of reference in respect to the related problem of modern
scientific devices for the invasion of privacy, see generally Report of the California
Senate Judiciary Committee on the Interception of Messages by the Use of Electronic
and other Devices (1957).
250. ACTON, THE HISTORY oF FREEDOM AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 3 (1907).
251. See generally POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (2d
ed. 1954).
252. See POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW Chs. III and IV, esp. at
100 (1921).
253. See CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 556 (1949) ; see also
id. Ch. XII.
254. Id. 556; see also Ch. XIV.
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ethics and morality are brought into the law through the development
of reason. The end of law becomes the assurance of moral conduct as
derived from reason, or the securing of individual rights derived from
the nature of man as a rational creature. The fourth stage is that of
maturity of the law. Here, the watchwords are "equality" and "secur-
ity." The end of law is free individual self-assertion. The working
out of individual rights is emphasized here; hence, emphasis is on
equality, property, and mechanical adherence to fixed rules. The fifth
stage, socialization of law, is marked by a new infusion of ethical notions
into the law, and emphasis on social rather than individual interests.
The end of law is the advancement of civilization through the protec-
tion of the social interests which are best designed to accomplish this
purpose. A complete change of attitude has been responsible for a
state of fluidity in the present stage of the law. Thus, in law and
philosophical thinking, there has been a continual broadening of the
sphere of recognized and secured interests, a widening of the conception
of the nature and end of law, from primitive societies to the present
day. Today, the social interest in the individual life is conceived of as
the value which makes for civilization.2 55
In western society there was born the ideal of respect for the indi-
vidual personality, and this ideal was later fertilized by the heritage
from the Judaeo-Christian religious ethos, which has maintained a
strong hold on western thought for nearly two thousand years.2 6 With
the Age of Reason, the Enlightenment, men came to grasp a finer vision
of life in the future than any past civilization had achieved, and -there
was born a hope to rise above the golden age of the ancients.25 7 With
this broader Weltanschauung, there came a new religion of man and a
new lease on life, a new hope for progress in the future. It has been
said that Grotius freed law from theology and that Hobbes was the
first modern man. Hobbes recognized that man is unique and that he
is all important to himself. Certain rights he has even against the
state.25 8 This idea was augmented by the writings of other social
thinkers, and John Locke gave man inherent natural rights which no
government could take away.259
255. For discussion of the stages of law and the ends of law in each successive
stage, see POUND, op. cit. note 252, 139. For consideration of the various social inter-
ests, particularly "the social interest in the individual life," see Pound, Survey passim,
esp. at 12. For the fact that we are now moving from contract to status, see POUND,
op. cit. note 252, 28; POUND, NEw PATHS OF THE LAW 22-23 (1950).
256. MULLER, USES OF THE PAST Ch. IV (1952).
257. See generally BRINTON, IDEAS AND MEN, esp. Ch. XI (1950).
258. HORBEs,LEvIATHAN, esp. Ch. XXI, esp. at 152 et seq. (Walter ed. 1904).
259. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT Chs. 4, 5, 6, 11, and 19
(1690). 19
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These ideas permeated the thought of our founding fathers. Men
believed that reason was the key that could unlock the universe. Grotius
taught that God himself could not make twice two other than four and
that man was fully capable of governing himself by reason of his ra-
tional nature even if God lacked interest in human affairs.26" The
doctrines of these centuries were such that men sneered at history and
set out to remake the world according to their own notions. As a
result, we have from this period new documents, political and legal
charts to guide man for all time thenceforth.
261
It was in the light of this background that the Constitution was
written, with a Bill of Rights setting forth and protecting certain prin-
ciples which were defined as inalienable rights. Natural law, demon-
strable by reason, existed to secure these rights. This it did through
positive law, which must conform to natural law. The state itself was
the product of a social compact into which man had entered to secure
his natural rights. Its purpose, authority, and limitations were pre-
scribed by natural law. The bills of rights in the Federal Constitution
and the various state constitutions were efforts to preserve these rights
inviolate and to transmit them to posterity. These documents recognize
that the state can become a kind of leviathan against which the indi-
vidual needs protection, that the individual has rights above and beyond
the state, which no government can rightfully take away, 262 and the
"concept of human dignity and inviolate personality" are natural rights
which ought to be protected.263
These constitutional rights have been much in the limelight in
recent years. The Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution was first
declared not binding on the states,264 but was later declared binding in
part, by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, the test being whether
a right is "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" '265 or "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental. 2 6 On a lesser scale, new rights have appeared under
the laws relating to privacy, beginning with a celebrated article in the
Harvard Law Review for 1890.27 That this right was originally
260. See Corwin, op. cit. note 17, 381, for a good discussion of the philosphy and
influence of Grotius.
261. See POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 12 (1923).
262. See Chase, J., in Calder v. Bull, 1 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-88 (1798).
263. Letter from Dean Pound to the writer, March 3, 1958, specifically pointing
to the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments, as to the federal gov-
ernment; and the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments as to the states.
Quoted with permission.
264. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
265. Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See also
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
266. Cardozo, J., in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
267. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
See also PROSSER, THE LAW op TORTS § 97 (Privacy) (2d ed. 1955) ; Pound, The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Right of Privacy, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 34 (1961).
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introduced into our law under the guise of a'property right did not
make it any the less an important "interest of personality."'2"'a The
right is probably older in European law.
With the rise of modern urban society and its concomitant prob-
lems of social control - the complex law enforcement agencies, the
efficient methods and devices of modern science used by both police
and criminals, the broad threat of modern crime - these rights of the
individual have been much pressed upon the courts and legislatures for
recognition in law. The nineteenth century was identified with the
commercial interests of the middle class, free trade, the rights of prop-
erty and contract, and an idealized version of eighteenth century natural
law. Even the so-called civil liberties took a back seat. An abstract
individual freedom of self-assertion was the all-important thing. 68 But
with the advent of the twentieth century, new ideals were in vogue, and
property and contract have been relegated to secondary status. Human
rights are in the forefront, and the rise of the modern police states and
the horrors of two world wars are impressing upon the people of the
western democracies the importance of constant vigilance for the preser-
vation of these rights of the individual. The picture has been one of
steadily increasing recognition of new constitutional rights and broad-
ened interpretation of old ones. Moreover, rights which are not deemed
sufficiently vital to be a part of due process have nevertheless been
enforced in the local forum of both state and federal courts as being
proper for the maintenance of higher judicial standards. This trend
is not yet at an end.2 6
9
Dean Pound has written much on the subject of claims pressing
for recognition in a given society, and he has demonstrated the need
for and the value of a set of jural postulates to express the jural ideals
of the civilization of the time and place. He has formulated such a set
of postulates as a framewrok in which to carry on his great work of
law reform through the balancing of social interests, and he has shown
how these postulates must change as society changes in its progress
toward civilization.2 70 As Pound has stated the matter in one of his
267a. See POUND, THE IDEAL ELEMENT IN LAW 245 (1958).
268. See generally POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938).
269. E.g.. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) ; People v. Cahan, 44
Cal. 2d 434, 282 P. 2d 905 (1955).
270. The jural postulates were first formulated in 1919 and are set out in POUND,
OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 168, 179, 183-84 (5th ed. 1943). There
are five in number and might be called "major major premises," under which all of
our rules and principles of substantive law can be subsumed. As to changes taking
place in our society which may render it necessary to form new postulates for the
correlative changes that are taking place in fundamental principles of the substantive
law, see POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 115 (1942) ; POUND, NEw PATHS
OF THE LAw 32 (1950). For the four basic steps in the balancing of interests, the
best concise summary is contained in Stone, A Critique of Pound's Theory of Justice,
20 IOWA L. REv. 531 (1935).
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best writings, a dogmatic scheme of natural law is not the answer to
the need for furthering civilization through legal purposes. Yet, judges
and legislators must have a more detailed picture to guide them in their
lawmaking tasks, "a clear picture whereby to lay out the lines of crea-
tive as well as of ordering and systematizing activity." The jurist at
least must realize that the picture is only a tentative one, which requires
constant "repainting."
The civilization of every time and place has certain jural postulates
- not rules of law but ideas of right to be made effective by
legal institutions and legal precepts. It is the task of the jurist
to ascertain and formulate the jural postulates not of all civiliza-
tion but of the civilization of the time and place - the ideas of
right and justice which it pre-supposes - and seek to shape the
legal materials that have come down to us so that they will express
or give effect to those postulates .... Given such jural postulates,
the legislator may alter old rules and make new ones to conform to
them, the judges may interpret, that is, develop by analogy and
apply, codes and traditional legal materials in the light of them,
and jurists may organize and criticize the work of legislatures
and courts thereby."'
Two important recent documents, which have formulated postu-
lates of procedure and have recognized the dignity of the individual
and his right to protection, are the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights and the Bill of Rights of the Canadian Constitution.
Article 10 of the Declaration of Rights provides:
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of
his rights and obligations and of any criminal charges against him.
Article 11 provides:
(1) Everyone charged with a penal offense has the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public
trial at which he had all the guarantees necessary for his defense.
Canada, a long-established government, ruling over a people in whom,-
the law-abiding habit is engrained, has nevertheless felt the need-for
a Bill of Rights in its written constitution (the British North American
Act). This document is entitled "An Act for the Recognition and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 2 7 2 For
our purposes, Part I, Sec. 3, is most important. It prohibits, among
other things, "inhuman or degrading treatment" and provides in sub-
271. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 147-48 (1923).
272. Loc. cit. note 246.
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section (c) that no person shall be compelled to give evidence if he is
denied counsel or other constitutional safeguards. Subsection (d) pro-
vides that no law shall "deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the deter-
mination of his rights and obligations"; and subsection (a) provides
that no law shall "deprive a person of the right to a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination
of any criminal charge against him." These general declarations as
guides for detailed procedures have been justified in legal writings.273
Professor Kauper has stressed the importance of procedural values in
the following passage:
The thesis may be advanced that procedural limitations repre-
sent the supreme legal achievement of any civilized society, for in
their primary impact on the administrative and judicial process
they do symbolize the basic idea of government by law, and the
further idea, implicit in the first, or certainly a corollary to it, that
all men shall receive equal treatment before the law. On these two
related propositions hangs much of our constitutional system. To
hem in and canalize the exercise of power when it is brought to
bear directly on the individual in order that his liberty shall not
be impaired except where required by the rule of law is the im-
portant function of procedural limitations. 4
The writer believes that a valuable addition to Dean Pound's
jural postulates of the substantive law would be a procedural postulate
to serve as a kind of "major major premise" '275 under which might be
subsumed the various claims or interests now struggling for mastery,
not only in the area of constitutional due process but in the area of
legislation and case law as well. One must evaluate procedural measures
against the background of the substantive rights which they are de-
signed to secure, the limitations of effective legal action, and the
practicability of the means of enforcement. This can best be done
through the use of reason and experience.
Justice Frankfurter was dealing with the abstract principle in
connection with a concrete claim when he spoke for the majority in
the Rochin case. There he defined due process of law as "those canons
of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
273.. Lederman, The Nature and Problems of a Bill of Rights, 37 CAN. B. REv.
4, 12-13 (1959). This issue of the Canadian Bar Review contains a valuable symposium
on the new Canadian Bill of Rights.
274. KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 146 (1956).
275. Since the ordinary principles of law in syllogistic reasoning are called major
premises, the principles under which they are subsumed might be called "major major
premises." Thanks to Dean Pound for the analogy of "natural natural law." See
Pound, Natural Natural Law and Positive Natural Law, 68 L. Q. REV. 330 (1952).
The natural sciences also use the phrase "per second per second" in describing the
speed of light. 23
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speaking peoples." The conception of due process, he holds, is no mere
fixed or static concept, nor subject to the mere personal and private
notions of the judges. The one would make for mechanical application
of the law, the other for wild caprice. Due process "requires an evalu-
ation based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science,
on a balanced order of facts exactly stated, on the detached considera-
tion of conflicting claims . . . on a judgment not ad hoc and episodic
but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and change
in a progressive society. ' 27 Here the court was limiting its considera-
tions to the matter of constitutional requirements. That there are con-
flicting claims struggling for recognition outside the constitutional area
is the basis of the jural postulates and of most of our substantive law
subsumed thereunder. The jural postulates go beyond what is required
by the Constitution as minimal protections to property, contract, per-
sonal liberty, and personal security. They represent the common ex-
pectation under government according to law in our western society
today.
As our law now exists, the privileges are procedural claims which
are a recognized part of the legal status quo. The original basis of the
privilege of attorney and client, the honor of the attorney, was weighed
and found insufficient in the Age of Reason. The combination of honor
and loyalty, on the one hand, together with the fear of treachery and
the felt need for free communication between the parties on the other,
has since served as the rational basis of the privilege. When Bentham
pointed out special problems, this was met by the "degrees of gray"
theory, which is premised on the recognized truth that in most civil
cases there is no clear-cut factual situation which indisputably puts one
party in the right and the other party in the wrong. These components,
however, are only elemental particles in a larger chart or scheme of
values which is summed up in the principle of human dignity. One
feels it on every hand. It permeates our serious thought and literature.
It is "in the air," so to speak. It is the teleological element in the
twentieth century scheme of values. If the privileges are to coincide with
twentieth century values, retain their vitality, and manifest a sound
salubrious growth, they must be subsumed under the cardinal principle
of human dignity. That the value of the privileges has been doubted
was due to the failure of the critics to understand this broader social
viewpoint and to perceive the need for the correlative change of
rationale.
To repeat, the basis for the recognition of the privileges today is
the twentieth century scheme of values, and here there must now be
276. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170, 171, 172 (1952).
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some major major premise under which the privileges may be properly
subsumed as a part of the scheme of interests. This will enable judges
and legislators to act as "social engineers"27 in the balancing of inter-
ests, and thus to shape the law to meet the needs of society with the
least friction and waste. Such a major major premise might be articu-
lated in the form of a jural postulate of procedure. Adopting the
Poundian style or form, the writer suggests the following formulation
of a procedural postulate: In civilized society men must be able to
assume:
That when they press or defend a claim subsumed under the
substantive law jural postulates of the civilization of the time and
place, they will be given a full and fair hearing, according to fair
and reasonable methods of procedure, designed to accomplish the
purposes of social justice. 7 8
It is submitted that such a postulate is the procedural ideal for
which we are striving in our time. It is more than a mere "preachment,"
because it represents a concrete goal toward which great human effort
is being directed, a standard by which we can measure our accomplish-
ments, and an ideal to which we can aspire. It is a practical formula-
tion because it describes not a mere far-off ideal, such as natural law
277. See POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY or LAW 47 (2d ed. 1954).
278. The writer suggested the idea of a procedural postulate to Dean Pound in
a personal conference at the Harvard Law School on February 25, 1958, and the
Dean encouraged the writer to formulate one. The postulate set out above, except for
certain minor deletions, was sent to Dean Pound on February 28, 1958, and he
replied on March 3, 1958, in a letter which is set out in full:
"Referring to the suggested jural postulate of procedure sent with your letter of
February 28, may I suggest what I said in my lecture before the Brooklyn Bar
Association [Pound, Toward a Law of the World, 9 BROOKI.YN BARRISTER 59 (1957)]
as to the elements of due process of law. On reflection I think that our jural postu-
lates of procedure must be due process of law. If so I still adhere to my statement
of those elements as follows: An independent, unbiased and courageous tribunal; full
notice in advance to all interested parties of the nature of the controversy to be
determined and the claim or claims to be urged or charges to be proferred [sicl by
the parties; a procedure affording full and free opportunity for each party to present
evidence in support of his or its case to the tribunal, to cross examine witnesses, and
to argue both the credibility, weight and relevance of the evidence, as to each item
and as a whole, and the legal propositions applicable thereto; and a judgment accord-
ing to law, not the will of the tribunal, and not directed directly or indirectly from
without. A shorter statement embracing these elements might serve your purpose.
"I quite agree that the concept of human dignity and inviolate personality,
recognized in the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th amendments to tile federal Consti-
tution, and as against the states in the 13th and 14th amendments is ultimately behind
the idea of due process of law. I think with those amendments in mind, and my
discussion and Lord Kilmuir's discussion to which I referred in my Brooklyn ad-
dress [Kilnuir, The State, the Citi7en and the Law, 73 L. Q. REv. 172 (1957)] you
will be able to formulate for yourself an adequate body of postulates of procedure.'"
(Quoted with permission.)
Lord Kihnuir's conccption of the substance of the major premises of fair pro-
cedure, referred to by Dean Pound, are apparently the ones set out on page 177 of
his article: "(a) the formulation of a fixed rule - that is the law; (b) the investi-
gation of the facts by an impartial and independent judge; (c) the ascertainment of
the truth by reasoned deduction from evidence, however adduced; (d) the unbiased
application of the rule to the facts found to be true."
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principles in the Greek city-state, but rather a generalization that com-
bines practical accomplishment with the ideals of the age, ideals which
we have achieved or for which we are still striving. "The intelligent
direction of human action necessarily involves the use of generaliza-
tions." '279 When one endeavors to embrace the whole field of procedure
under a single generalization, it must necessarily be very general, but
it represents a criterion by which to test procedure as a whole with
reference to values no less important than those of the substantive law.
Moreover, these procedural values are just as important in the accom-
plishment of the end of justice conceived in terms of the advancement
of civilization.2 0 As to the concept of human dignity, the postulate
necessarily embraces this under both the term "fair and reasonable" in
relation to methods of procedure and again under the term "social
justice." What is "fair and reasonable" depends only superficially upon
the spirit of the times, Zeitgeist, and ultimately upon the Weltan-
schauung of the civilization, the latter being that part of our cultural
outlook which has endured and become the permanent scheme of values.
Our "World View" is the product of the values which have been ac-
cumulating in time, in the light of the felt needs of our particular age.
It is the sum total of our heritage as we understand it today. The
term "social justice" takes into consideration all the components which
go to make up the jural objectives of society, what might be termed
jus, right, or law. A fair procedure is only a part of this concept, but
it is important as an instrumental value in proportion to the extent to
which it can be an influence for the accomplishment of good or the in-
fliction of harm. It is the means by which we can strive to achieve the
intrinsic values and thus ultimately to lead the good life. Bearing in
mind the ethical ideal that humanity, including each individual, should
be treated as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end, we
perceive at once that procedures are no less important than principles
of substantive law, that fair procedures are not necessarily and entirely
those which get at the technical truth most efficiently, but rather those
which reasonably endeavor to accomplish this objective, taking into
account the various other values which are components of the entire
picture that we designate as "justice." Therefore, in the balancing of
interests, a procedural postulate has an important role to play, and the
concept of human dignity and inviolate personality is one of the com-
ponents which constitute that postulate.
In formulating this postulate, the writer does not maintain that
it is drawn from the mass of claims being asserted by litigants in society
279. Bingham, What Is Law?, 11 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 12 (1912).
280. See generally POUND, THE FORMATIrE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938)
POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 148 (1923).
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today,28 ' though concededly this may be a factor in its recognition.
However, the writer sees it as the articulation of an ideal toward which
jurists, philosophers, and social planners are striving, and it can lay
claim to some foundation in current legal decision. Therefore, although
it can point to some historic antecedents in its lineage, the procedural
postulate is clearly oriented toward the future. What was recently said
by a man of affairs in connection with human affairs in general is
worth consideration here as a facet of the larger problem:
The big need today is to break out of the narrow old nationalisms
and to develop larger allegiances. Human society today is still
underdeveloped and immature: it is still rather tribal in its atti-
tudes. The trouble with nationalism is that it tends to seal people
in, to cut them off from the larger experiences that we need if the
human family as a whole is to figure out a way of staying alive...
I have the feeling that the world today desperately needs a break-
through. We have to find some way of breaking through old
approaches, old habits of thought, that are part of a world divided
into hardened national sovereignties. I take my stand on the
ground that these old approaches are no longer workable. They
can't maintain peace. They can't protect people. They can't main-
tain freedom. They can't even maintain national independence.
The kind of break-through we need is not just one of establishing
a new form, necessary though it may be for the grouping of the
nations. The break-through we need may require people to think
about themselves in a new way, with new and higher relationships
and loyalties. 82
The writer submits that such a "break-through" in law is imminent
and will be forthcoming as we critically re-examine the law in the light
of twentieth century needs, methods, and values. The concept of
human dignity as embodied in the above proposed procedural postulate
is a phrase of this progress.
In urging "an engineering interpretation" of the law, Dean Pound
has said:
An interpretation that will stimulate juristic activity in common-
law countries, that will bring our writers and teachers to lead
courts and legislatures, not to follow them with a mere ordering
and systematizing and reconciling analysis, will have done its
work well. 2
3
On a small scale, this paper is an attempt to aid the courts to do more
than order, systematize, and reconcile analysis of the extant rules of
281. Pound, in My PHILOSOPHY Op LAW 249-69 at 249 (1941) ; POUND, OUTLINES
ov LECTURES IN JURISPRUDENCE 96 (5th ed. 1943).
282. Cousins, The Puerto Rican Mixture, in SATURDAY RrviEw 26 (December
5, 1959), quoting from Governor Munoz-Marin.
283. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS Op LEGAL HISTORY 165 (1923).
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law subsumed under the legalistic conception of the attorney-client
privilege. The privilege was derived historically from an intuitively
felt need and later justified by a post hoc abstract rationalist foundation.
It was then expanded beyond its strict necessities as a result of pro-
fessional interest and lack of legal learning. It now requires re-evalu-
ation in the light of new ideals which are taking shape in the twentieth
century and delimitation in accordance with the needs created by the
circumstances of society today. A re-writing of the whole body of our
law, both procedural and substantive, with this approach as the criter-
ion, is the task which faces the next generation of jurists. In connec-
tion with such advancement, we must not forget the way in which the
phenomena of growth and progress take place. Words written in con-
nection with the growth of freedom, itself the matrix of a larger whole,
are equally in point here:
It is obvious that the earlier writers could not have been meeting
issues raised by those who came after them. And the number of
later writers who focus on issues as framed by their predecessors
is very limited. Rather, they start from new insights, a new
hypothesis, a different experience. They ask and answer new
questions, or at least discuss the old ones from a new point of
view which advances our understanding of the problem to a new
level."84
Our law was taken over from England and re-written to meet
the needs of a nineteenth century rural economy. Some principles were
rationalized; others have been accepted on authority. This law must
now be re-written to meet twentieth century urban needs and must be
undergirded with sound legal principles. The commentators and jurists
have put system into the modern Roman law. We have attempted to
do it through procedure and later, in particularly important subjects,
through the writings of jurists and teachers, the development of uni-
form laws, and the Restatement of the American Law Institute. "But
until this putting of system into particular subjects or branches has been
carried out to substantial completeness, we shall not be able to put
system effectively into our law as a whole. '2 5 The varied subjects in
284. Pound, Introduction, CLARK, SUMMARY Op AMERICAN LAW iv-vii (1947).
"There is manifest need for a system of Anglo-American law. There is need of an
institutional book, which we cannot expect until we have developed a system. The
books on 'elementary law' in the last century and the perennial attempts at new
editions of Blackstone failed because they purported to set forth a system in a
subject in which there was no system to expound." Id. v.
285. Morray, Book Review 47 CALIv. L. REv. 201, 202 (1959). The reviewer
points to the analogy of growth in the scientific field, where each generation went
beyond the previous one, making new assumptions and gaining new insights to form
new hypotheses suggested by new evidence, but always with continuity and building
on the work of the past. Id. 202.
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our law are now nearing a system of completeness and only require
being rounded out and adapted to our continuing growth and devel-
opment. But we must wait a while for system to come to our law in
its entirety and in the interrelation of its various branches. Nor will
this come by fiat of some juristic genius. It will come with a broad
understanding which develops with the fulfillment of the system as a
complete body of law.216
B. The Privilege as an Absolute Rule versus Qualified Immunity:
There is a close relation between the privilege against self-incrim-
ination, the privilege against illegal search and seizure, the right to
counsel, a fair hearing, and the various procedural requirements "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty."2 7 Closely connected with these
notions is the right to reasonable privacy and a high respect for the
individual as an inviolate personality. In this scheme of values, im-
portant to liberty and justice as an ideal relation among men in ordered
society, the personal privileges have an important part to play.
The jural postulate proposed above does not give an absolute
recognition to these specific doctrines of adjective law. Rather, it
recognizes the values involved in the competing social interests strug-
gling for recognition, or to quote Justice Frankfurter, "interests of
society pushing in opposite directions. '28 8 Actually the privileges are a
generally recognized part of our law, and the question is whether they
should be extended, curtailed, or abolished. The writer agrees with
Professor Louisell that much of the confusion pertaining to the privi-
leges today is the result of the conflict of opinion between the writers
on evidence and the bench and bar as to the value of the privileges.28 9
Both of these groups, however, view the privileges from the peculiar
vantage point of their own specialty. A careful evaluation requires
that consideration should be given not only to the opinions of these
groups but also to the studies of the legal philosophers as well. It is
this last-named group that is specially equipped to arbitrate the effective
weight to be allocated to the various competing interests involved. The
personal privileges will ultimately stand or fall with the above-men-
tioned constitutional rights: the right to privacy and the respect for
the individual as an inviolate personality. These are all a part of the
same stone, hued from the same quarry - the paramount position of
286. Op. cit. note 284, iv-vii.
287. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
288. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952).
289. See Louisell passim.
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the individual as a cardinal entity in the scheme of western values.
Taken altogether, they constitute the essence of human dignity. 9
Then, by what method shall we evaluate the privileges? The
answer is by the application of the above-stated principles and the
balancing of interests in accordance therewith. The privileges should
not always prevail because they are not absolutes.29' They must be
weighed against competing interests or policies, in order that fair rules
may be worked out as to applicability, scope, and duration. Moreover,
within the narrow confines of "molecular motion" the judges must not
hesitate to restrict or to extend the privileges in accordance with these
principles. However, such extension must be by judicial precedent and
not by discretion in the individual case, except perhaps in a few in-
stances, such as hereinafter considered, where discretion might be con-
ferred by legislation. The most important point to realize, however,
is that the privileges are not just anachronisms come down from a
prior age of confusion in the law of evidence or the product of mere
maudlin sentimentality, 2 2 but that they continue to exist nd are dy-
namic because they have worth in relation to the degree that they help to
preserve important human values in our society, values that justify some
lessened efficiency in the detection and punishment of crime or in the
preservation of rights of property and contract. In fact, considering
the twentieth century scheme of values in the light of the complexities
of today's world, the writer believes that the greatest worth of the
personal privileges lies in their anticipated role of service to future
generations. As the personal relationship in modern urban society
becomes more impersonal, some solvent such as the privileges will
become more essential as a psychologically desirable basis for confiden-
tiality in those relationships where rapport is a professional necessity.
The next point to remember is that the privileges should not be con-
strued more broadly than necessary to accomplish this purpose.
The tendency to treat the privileges in too "absolute" a manner and
without adequate consideration for the competing interests involved is
well illustrated by the case of United States v. Fair.29 In that case,
290. Albert Schweitzer's phrase "Reverence for Life" is a much broader term,
but Schweitzer would undoubtedly agree that the same part of our ethos which sparks
the concept that has become his guiding philosophy also contains the elements which
give rise to the included value concept of the principle of human dignity. See
SCHWEITZER, op. cit. note I passimn, esp. at 156.
291. By "absolute" as used here, we mean something like this: eternal, immutable,
not subject to question.
292. Referring to the privilege against self-incrimination, Wigmore terms it "a
mark of traditional sentimentality." VIII WIGMORE § 2251 at 317. Speaking of the
case of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), which raised the issue of
illegal search and seizure, Dean Wigmore described it as a "heretical influence" and
the thought which justifies it as "misguided sentimentality." Id. § 2184 at 32, 36.
293. 2 U.S.C.M.A. 521, 10 C.M.R. 19 (1953), criticized in Note, 6 STAN. L. Rtv.
363-68 (1954) (excellent).
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soldier A, suspected of being party to a murder, was granted immunity
from prosecution and turned state's witness. At the trial, A testified
that defendant B, a fellow soldier, had fired the fatal shot. On cross-
examination, A was asked if he had not originally informed his counsel,
who was the cross-examiner and counsel for B, that he, A, had fired
the fatal shot. A refused to answer, claiming the privilege against self-
incrimination. A's claim of privilege was sustained by the trial court,
and the ruling was upheld on appeal. The appellate court recognized
two rights as inherent in the privilege, to wit: (1) freedom from fear
of incrimination; and (2) freedom from fear of social disgrace.2 94 It
recognized that while the former was not present in the instant case,
the latter remained an issue, and therefore the claim of privilege was
properly sustained. 95 But on a balancing of interests, it would seem
that in criminal cases the paramount value to be protected is the right
to be free to conduct a fair defense, and that once the defense has been
completed or has become unnecessary, the privilege should cease to exist.
This would seem true a fortiori when the liberty of an individual hangs
in the opposite balance.29 6
The celebrated Leo Frank case contains an interesting illustration
of the problems which can arise in the area where the privilege may
tend to frustrate not only the ascertainment of the truth but also the
vindication of innocence and the protection of individual freedom. In
his fascinating autobiography, the late Judge Arthur G. Powell stated
that he knew that Leo Frank was innocent." 7 He did not indicate how
this information came to him, but the reasonable implication was that
294. Professor McCormick lists four dangers against which the privilege protects:
incrimination, penalties and forfeitures, disgrace, civil liability. McCORmIcK § 128.
Protection from these dangers would be afforded in any principle or rule limiting the
discovery of evidence or proof of facts.
In the early seventeen hundreds a privilege was recognized against compelling
answers as to matters not material to the issues, which would degrade or disgrace
though not incriminate the witness. This privilege has become obsolete in England
and in most of our states [except where statutes have preserved the relic: e.g., CAL.
CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 2065]. The policy behind this former rule is now given effect
by rules restricting the scope of cross-examination as to collateral matters. Mc-
CORMICK § 128.
295. The rule that an accomplice forfeits the privilege was held not to apply
because technically A was not an accomplice. The rule that the privilege does not
apply inter sese when two or more persons having shared an attorney concerning a
matter of common interest subsequently take adverse positions with respect to the
same was apparently not deemed relevant, and a joint client may waive the privilege
only for his own individual statements. See op. cit. note 149 at 276-78 and sources
cited.
296. See III WIGMORE §§ 984-87; VIII WIGIORV § 2255. These sections discuss
the privilege against answering questions which tend to disgrace. It is recognized in
a few jurisdictions today, and Wigmore criticizes it severely. The writer agrees.
297. POwELL, I CAN Go HOME AGAIN 291 (1943). When the writer first read
Judge Powell's autobiography, which was before he had studied law, he was dis-
turbed to find that the law should permit this situation to exist. Time has not
changed his views.
For a fuller account of the Frank case, see Buscr, GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY Ch.
1 (1952).
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it came to him as a privileged communication from a client to his
attorney. Judge Powell stated that he could never reveal the informa-
tion so long as certain persons were living.298 This information came
to him while Leo Frank was in the state penitentiary of Georgia under
sentence of death, following his conviction of a terrible crime.2 99 As-
suming that the information came to Judge Powell either directly
through a client or through another attorney acting in behalf of a
client seeking legal advice, Judge Powell was correct in recognizing
that he could not reveal it without the permission of the client.30° In
fact, he could not reveal it even after the client's death, since the privi-
lege as a general rule continues to exist for all time. Yet, the writer
submits that the law should be changed, at least to permit, and probably
to require counsel to come forward and make full disclosure when an-
other person who is innocent has been charged with or sentenced for
the commission of a crime. This requirement, of course, might not
extend to the case where counsel does not learn of the wrongful accusa-
tion or conviction until it is too late to rectify the case, as where the
wrongfully accused party is no longer living or has served his sentence
or has obtained a dismissal of the charges. The termination of the privi-
lege would occur only when this would tend to effectuate the principle
sought to be recognized as controlling. Here, the answer must follow
naturally from the recognition of the higher values which are presently
being defeated by the recognition of the privilege under the circum-
stances, namely, the combined interest of the state in detecting crime,
punishing the guilty, and protecting the innocent. It seems particularly
shocking that there is a rule of law which would go so far as to protect
a guilty man at the expense of an innocent one.30 1 The writer believes
298. But the privilege extends beyond life for all time, except it be waived. VIII
WiCMORF § 2323.
299. Incidentally, the case was one in which the jury was dominated by mob
violence.
300. Nor could disclosure be made under the theory that the consultation was
in furtherance of a crime or tort, for the crime involved had already been consummated.
See VIII WIGMORE § 2298. Yet it is obvious that this salutary rule is of far less
social importance in a particular case, though it may come into play more often.
The writer assumes of course that Judge Powell was not on the bench at that
time. See Prichard v. United States, 181 F. 2d 326 (6th Cir. 1950); afirmned 339
U.S. 974 (1950) (advice of judge to "client" held not privileged). See VIII WIGMIO
§ 2376; MCCORMICK § 92 at 185-86. Wigmore argues for a privilege for communica-
tions made in confidence to the court. McCormick disagrees with Wigmore. He
points out that such revelations would ordinarily embarrass the judge in carrying
out his duties. The writer submits that if any privilege can be justified here, it must
not be comprehended under the principle governing the attorney-client privilege, and
the judge should be the holder of the privilege, with revelation to be in his discretion.
However, the writer would deny the privilege in accordance with keeping the rules
prohibiting disclosure of evidence within the strictest bounds. This would exclude the
judge who is not concurrently a practicing attorney and acting in that capacity (or
believed by the communicant to be so acting) when he receives the communication.
301. The general treatment of the rule as an absolute begins to appear absurd
when one reflects upon the numerous situations in which the privilege has been forced
to yield to more important policy considerations. The examples will be found mostly
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that the law should give only a qualified privilege in serious criminal
cases, particularly where the death sentence is involved,3"2 and that this
privilege should be terminated when counsel learns that the criminal
conviction of an innocent person has taken place. Moreover, it should
be the ethical duty of counsel under such circumstances to come forward
and make full disclosure to the court of such knowledge as he might
have which would vindicate the wrongfully convicted party.
30 3
C. Application of Principles to Other Privileges:
Another point at which numerous jurists are negative absolutists
is in connection with the creation of new privileges to cover relation-
ships not heretofore accorded the protection of immunity from dis-
closure of the confidential communications of the parties. Many
writers favor the limitation of the classes of privileges to those recog-
nized at the classical common law. Some of these writers state their
case with a positivity which apparently admits of no room for opposi-
tion. Though these authors may confirm their position by rational
analysis, the writer submits that strong arguments can be presented for
according privileges to certain personal relationships not previously held
entitled to immunity from disclosure through compulsory process. The
Wigmore test has been discussed earlier herein.30 4 Applying this test,
the writer would extend the privilege of confidential communications
to physicians (including psychiatrists), psychologists, and marriage
counsellors; he would deny it to accountants, house counsel, insurance
counsel representing the assured, 30 5 and some types of agents. He would
also deny it to large (at least, quasi-public) corporations and govern-
mental agencies. We will consider these relationships in connection
with a confidential communications privilege in the remainder of this
section.
in the area relating to the crime or tort exception and the area of application of
waiver principles. The cases go so far as to hold that the privilege does not apply
when there is a dispute between the client and his lawyer - for example, over the
fee of the latter. The exceptions are summarized in rule 26(2), UNIFORM RULES.
The writer submits, however, that all of these exceptions as well as the one suggested
above are sound. It might be added that in the case of these exceptions the com-
munications will be found not to pass the test laid down by Dean Wigmore in his
four principles (VIII WIGMORE § 2285).
302. Referring to the death sentence, Professor Cahn speaks of "the insight of
irreversibility." Cahn, Fact-Skepticism and Fundamental Law, 33 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1
passim (1958). Any wrongful conviction is irreversible, but it might be said that
death is the most irreversible of all. It has a terrifying finality.
303. For additional cases, see op. cit. note 149 at 275 and note 45.
304. These principles are discussed in text at note 203.
305. That is, insurance counsel theoretically representing the insured but actually
representing the carrier alone or primarily (and only incidentally representing the
insured).
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First, consider the position of the psychiatrist and the psycholo-
gist.30 6 Should the consultations of the patient with his professional
counsellor be privileged? The writer submits that they should be. The
role of these classes of practitioners is one that is vital to society, be-
cause of the preservation and improvement of the mental health of the
people; it is one of growing importance, both by reason of the increase
in medical knowledge available, the increase in the number of cases
involving problems of mental health, and the intimate nature of the
disclosures which effective psychiatric treatment requires. It is im-
portant for people to have physicians, and in order for the treatment
to be effective, the patients must give their full cooperation. This co-
operation can only be gained by the physician if he has the complete
trust and confidence of the patient 0 6 a The assurance of the complete
confidentiality of the relationship is a most important factor in obtain-
ing and keeping this trust and confidence of the patient. Though
seldom called into court without his consent, a physician will occasion-
ally be compelled to testify, particularly in a criminal case or a domestic
relations matter. The patient's communications might be protected
under the attorney-client privilege,"0 7 but by the better rule this will
not generally hold true. Hence, if the confidentiality of the relationship
of physician (or psychologist) and patient is to be maintained, it must
be done through the according of the privilege to the confidential as-
pects of the relationship for its own sake and not through some other
privilege. In the domestic relations cases, more good might result to
all parties concerned by not having the confidential items disclosed,
and in any event the information could be obtained in other ways.
These are practical considerations, but they are not the basis on which
the physician-patient privilege should rest. The only proper basis on
which the privilege can be fully justified is through the according of
some special recognition to the dignity of the individual in this highly
personal relationship which society should desire to protect from un-
necessary intrusion. Interests of substance, such as property and con-
306. The differences between psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, and psychologists are
clarified in GUTTMACHER & WIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 6-9 (1952).
306a. "The essence of professional secrecy is that the patient should be able to
tell the practitioner everything that is necessary for his medical assessment and
treatment. This means that the doctor must hear many things that otherwise would
remain in the knowledge of the patient alone. The patient must be entirely confident
that nothing he reveals will go further. Once there is a suspicion among patients
that their confidences are not safe with a doctor the relationships between them
become seriously impaired and quite unsuited to the proper practice of medicine."
HADFIELD, LAW AND ETHICS FOR DOCTORS 56 (1958).
307. San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P. 2d 26 (1951). Here,
Dr. C., at the request of P's attorney, examined P as an aid to trial preparation. It
was held that the physician-patient privilege did not apply but that the attorney-
client privilege did apply. The client in communicating his physical condition to
counsel required the assistance of the physician to interpret it to the attorney.
[VOL. 8: p. 447
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tract, are insignificant factors here. Such protection as they acquire
through the recognition of the right to maintain confidentiality in this
area should be treated as purely incidental. °Ta The important values
here are the interests of personality. Personal liberty may be involved;
but the main items are freedom from fear of social disapproval and
freedom from fear of disturbance of intimate personal relationships
other than that of physician and patient itself. Here, the social interest
in the individual life... would seem to stand out above all others.
To a lesser extent, the justification for the recognition of the
principle of confidentiality which the privilege affords to the psychiatrist-
patient relationship extends also to other areas of the physician-patient
relationship, though such justification is probably not so strong in
these areas as it is in the area of psychiatric treatment.3 09 The regular
medical practitioner learns many things incidentally which might not
be strictly necessary to the treatment of the patient's physical ailments.
Nevertheless, this knowledge is obtained in the course of treatment, as
a part of the broader confidence that a close physician-patient relation-
ship engenders, it usually comes naturally under the circumstances, and
it may be of importance in diagnosis and treatment. For example, it
may be important in determining whether the physical ailment com-
plained of is merely symptomatic of psychosomatic illness or whether
the patient has actual physical illness of some kind. It may be impor-
tant in determining the kind of treatment to be prescribed and in ascer-
taining whether the patient is responding to the particular treatment.
Thus, it is obvious that the effective treatment of the patient is pro-
moted to some extent by the recognition of a privilege for confidential
communications in the non-psychiatric area. However, as in the case
of the attorney and client, this is not essential to the adequate disclosure
of the information on which treatment will be predicated. Therefore,
this privilege, if it is to be sustained, cannot be sustained on the basis
of its promotion of full disclosure alone. If this privilege is to be sus-
tained, it must be sustained largely on the basis of the psychological
effect on the patient of forced disclosure and fear of forced disclosure
- facets of the insecurity of personality in the area of privacy, as a part
of the dignity of the individual. If the privilege is recognized here, it
30 7a. In fact, the interests of substance of the opponent at least weigh equally in
the balance, and the opposing interests cancel out each other. Furthermore, in any
long range evaluation, the protection of such interests can best be achieved by the
abolition of all privileges, since their protection lies in the maintenance of the highest
degree of accuracy in fact-finding, as in all other phases of the judicial process.
308. Survey 12.
309. For what appears -to be the definitive treatment of the physician-patient
privilege from the practical standpoint of the view of the lawyer in daily practice,
see DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT
(1958). 35
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should be given a broad construction in order to fully effectuate its
purpose and without strict regard to the rules of relevancy.310
The physician-patient privilege is entirely statutory in origin,
having first been adopted by the state of New York in 1828 and since
that time by more than half of the other states.3" There are sixteen
states which do not recognize the privilege. It should be granted by
legislation in those states, and the grant should be broad enough to
include practicing psychologists as well as physicians and psychiatrists.
In those states now recognizing the physician-patient privilege, a
similar privilege should be accorded by legislation to consulting
psychologists. 312
Dean Wigmore argues against recognition of this privilege, hold-
ing that his four fundamental principles are not satisfied. 1 He points
to the North Carolina law, which allows a qualified privilege, 314 as a
substantial improvement over the law of those states where the privi-
lege is recognized unqualifiedly. But the cases in which injustice might
tend to result from the recognition of the claim of immunity under the
medical privilege fall primarily in three categories, namely: (1) work-
men's compensation cases; (2) personal injury claims; and (3) suits
based on life insurance policies. In the area covered by these categories,
however, the privilege of confidentiality is not accorded its customary
degree of recognition. Thus, modern industrial accident legislation has
made an exception to the privilege in that category of litigation.315 As
to the second category, some of the statutes provide that by bringing
suit for personal injuries one waives the privilege to the extent that
one's physical condition might become an issue. 16 And as to the last-
named category, according to the better rule, one may waive the privi-
lege by including an express provision to that effect in the policy, and
310. But see Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948) (phy-
sician permitted to testify that plaintiff said he did not see the vehicle which struck
him).
311. VIIIWIGMOR8 § 2380. In addition to New York, twenty-nine other states
and the District of Columbia now have such statutes. Id. § 2380; see also Note, 47
Nw. U. L. Rnv. 384 (1952), setting out statutes.
312. See Weihofen, Privileged Communications between Psychiatrist and Patient,
28 IND. L. Rtv. 32 (1952).
313. VIII WIGMORE § 2380a. The late Professor Chaffee also opposed this
privilege. Chaffee, Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth
on the Witness Stand, 52 YALE L. J. 607 (1943). For a highly critical view of the
physician-patient privilege, see Geer and Adamson, The Uniform Rules of Evidence:
A Defendant's View, 40 MINN. L. REv. 347, 356-58 (1956).
314. VIII WIGMORE § 2380a at 815 citing N. C. GEN. STAT. vol. IA § 8-53 (1953).
315. Id. 2380 and n. 6.
316. A typical statute is that of California. See CAL. CODE OF CiV. PRoc. § 1881
(4). See the statutes set out in VIII WIGMORE § 2380 n. 5 at 803.
Moreover, the privilege is waived if the patient testifies to privileged matter in
any case. Likewise, liberal courts hold that if the holder calls one physician to
testify to privileged matter, he waives the privilege not only as to the particular
doctor but as to all other doctors he has consulted in the case. VIII WicssOR4
§ 2390; McCoRmIcK § 106.
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such contractual waiver provisions are recognized as valid in a
majority of the states.317 Thus, the insurance company can adequately
protect itself. While much might be said for a qualified privilege in
the area of physician-patient relations, the writer believes that the above-
indicated types of exceptions should cover most of the hardship cases,
and the answer to the qualified privilege argument in the remainder
of the cases would be that, at least in non-jury cases, to disclose the
information to the trier of fact on some kind of voir dire examination
might well result in the injury (through preliminary disclosure) which
the policy supporting the privilege endeavors to avoid.31 This is
because when they are trying non-jury cases, even judges might not
be able to keep their knowledge of the category of excluded evidence
(revealed on voir dire but not admitted into the record) separate and
distinct from the category of evidence admitted into the record of the
trial.3
18 a
Nevertheless, something might be said in favor of providing some
kind of in camera disclosure when "good cause" should first be shown
in a pretrial hearing. Such good cause would be in the nature of a
showing of need for the particular evidence in order to make out a
case (or to afford a higher degree of proof than the minimum require-
ment), on the one hand, balanced against the harm to interests of per-
sonality which would be likely to result from judicially compelled dis-
closure, on the other. The likelihood of harm resulting from such com-
pelled disclosure would be reduced if provision should be made for the
court to first hear the matter in chambers and to receive the initial
disclosure in confidence. The particular pretrial procedure would have
to be worked out, but some preliminary inspection, such as the English
courts follow in close cases when the attorney-client privilege is claimed,
would seem to be in order. It is believed that this would have a salu-
tary effect in several respects. First, it would tend to limit the claim
317. VIII WIGMORt § 2388. All but two states, Michigan and New York, rec-
ognize that contractual stipulations waiving the privilege are valid and effectual. See
MCCORMICK § 106 at 217. But N. Y. INSURANcE LAW § 149 (4) provides that if
the plaintiff prevent& full disclosure the alleged misrepresentation shall be deemed
proven and material.
318. The MODEL. CODE op EVIDENC4, Rules 220-22 (1942) and the UNIFORM RULES,
rule 27 are so drawn as to give adequate protection against abuses which might arise
from a claim of this privilege. One writer has proposed that "as a basic principle,
the law should honor the judgment of a doctor who reasonably decides that he must
reveal certain information to protect an interest that he believes, in good faith is
more important than his patient's interest in keeping the information secret ...
A court should inquire only whether, under the circumstances, the doctor exercised
his discretion reasonably .. " subject however to certain provisions suggested to
prevent abuse and to aid in promoting uniformity. Note, Medical Practice and the
Right to Privacy, 43 MINN. L. REv. 943, 962 (1959).
318a. See also Functional Overlap 1245, which opposes the placing of such dis-
cretion in the court in the case of any privilege, in the absence of a showing that the
privilege is more "dangerously obstructive" than appears to be the case at the present
time.
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of privilege to areas where true interests of personality might other-
wise be harmed. Moreover, in close cases, unless the matter is pre-
liminarily revealed, it is most difficult for a court to make a sound
determination as to whether disclosure should be judicially compelled.
It should also be pointed out that permitting such preliminary judicial
evaluation of evidence would have a stronger claim to recognition than
would the non-recognition of a privilege for such communications when
the equities favoring recognition and those opposing it are closely
balanced. Furthermore, such preliminary judicial examination of the
evidence would tend to minimize the harm which might otherwise occur
to interests of personality as a result of such disclosure, since it might
be assumed that the court would tend to rule according to the element
of moral persuasion in close cases. Such procedure would also tend to
have a salutary effect in the deterrence of parties in the pursuit of
causes tainted with fraud or having the appearance of being so tainted.
This would probably be the chief benefit that might result from the
establishment of a qualified immunity only in this area.
A good illustration of the kind of situation in which the physician-
privilege works well without interference with accurate fact-finding is
the following case, taken from the experience of a successful practicing
lawyer: In a personal injury action, counsel for the plaintiff feared that
defense counsel would bring out on cross-examination of plaintiff's
personal physician the fact that plaintiff had once been afflicted with
syphillis. This fact was irrelevant to the issues, but might have ad-
versely affected the jury's decision and would definitely have been
detrimental to plaintiff's relations with her husband's family and per-
haps to her relationship with her husband also. Her counsel, therefore,
did not call her physician to the witness stand, and if the defendant
had called him, counsel was prepared to claim the physician-patient
privilege. By reason of the protection, which the privilege accorded in
this instance, counsel was allowed considerably more freedom of action
than the circumstances would otherwise have permitted. Furthermore,
opposing counsel was not able to introduce an irrelevant, but preju-
dicial, element into the case, assuming that he had knowledge of the
particular item of medical history." 9 Thus, the cause of justice was
actually aided by the privilege in two respects. More important, how-
ever, than the cases in which such factors are present in litigation is
the psychological satisfaction which the privilege must afford in the
many instances in which litigation never actually arises.a
2 °
319. De Parcq, op. cit. note 119, 326.
320. See also text at notes 177-81.
The UNIFORM RULES, rule 27 (4) stripped this privilege of practically all useful-
ness by making it inapplicable when the condition of the patient is an element or
[ VOL. 8: p. 447
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To sum up, the relationship of the physician and his patient, at
least in a restricted area, covers matters in which the fear of incrimina-
tion and the fear of social disgrace lurk just around the corner. While
the fear is likely to be exaggerated and more imaginary than real, for
social-jural purposes it must be reckoned with as a hard fact because
the physical and mental health of the patient is no less at stake than if
the matter were a deleterious substance infecting the patient's working
environment. The normal desire for privacy in an area of the individ-
ual's personal and ultimate problems is an additional factor. Moreover,
here the personal relationship is strong, and counselling for the long
range future is an important factor. Hence, it follows that the estab-
lishment and maintenance of rapport between the parties is essential to
the best treatment of the patient. In this area, the privilege is justifiable,
and the numerous exceptions tend to hold it within reasonable bounds.
The writer submits that Dean Wigmore's four fundamental tests are
met.
Until 1959, Illinois had repeatedly refused to enact the physician-
patient privilege into law. 21 Yet, in 1952, in a case of first impression,
a trial court judge in Chicago held that a privilege existed for confi-
dential communications between a patient and her psychiatrist in a
domestic relations case (alienation of affections)., 22 It is highly
questionable whether this result should have been reached in the absence
of legislation and whether it should be construed as a precedent cover-
ing non-psychiatric cases of confidential communications between phy-
sician and patient. The answer no doubt depends upon one's philosophy
of law, particularly as relates to a theory of judicial decision.32 ' The
writer submits, however, that it would be much easier to reach this
result in the case of consultation with psychologists in those states
which already recognize the physician-patient privilege.324
It is questionable as to whether the physician-patient privilege
should extend to criminal cases of the type where the physical examina-
tion of the patient or his communications to the examining physician
factor of the claim or defense of the patient. The rule also contains other broad
exceptions.
321, The privilege not to disclose confidential communications was extended to
the physician-patient relationship in Illinois in that year. ILL. RE v. STAT. ch. 51 § 5.1(1959). It does not apply when the party's "physical or mental condition is an issue."
Ibid.
322. Judge Harry M. Fisher, in Binder v. Ruvell, Civil No. 52C535, Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois, June 24, 1952; noted in 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 384 (1952).
323. The significance of this material in relation to a theory of judicial decision
has been discussed by the writer in an article entitled The Supreme Court and Philos-
ophy of Law, 5 VILL. L. REv. 180, 198 (1959).
324. It has been so extended by legislation in New York. See N. Y. EDUCATION
LAW § 7611.
Presumably, the psychiatrist is included in the term "physician" in connection
with the physician-patient privilege, since he holds an M.D. degree.
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for purposes of diagnosis and treatment are relevant in the proof of
serious crime. Here again, the infringement of the right to privacy
must be balanced against the policy favoring the scientific principle,
but there is also in the balance on the side of the latter the social interest
of the state in individual security in the more important sense of free-
doma from physical transgression. Nevertheless, in the case of the
psychiatrist and his patient, a strong argument can be made in support
of the privilege, as the relationship is far more personal and intimate
than that of physician and patient in general .1 2'  The case for the
recognition of a privilege for the confidential communications of psy-
chiatrists and their patients has been stated most persuasively in the
following passage:
The reasons are apparent to anyone with even the most basic
understanding of this field [i.e., psychiatry]. A relationship of
extreme trust and confidence must be established often even before
the patient reveals anything of value to the psychiatrist. Fear of
disclosure may delay or prevent altogether the creation of [t]his
relationship; on the other hand, legal assistance of non disclosure
would cast aside at least one barrier to establishing the essential
rapport. Necessary to this method of treatment is the revelation
by the patient himself of the acts and thoughts precipitating his
illness, whereas in the ordinary case of physical illness, such par-
ticipation by the patient is often unimportant. If fear of disclosure
silenced the patient at this point, the entire treatment process
would be frustrated. The argument that the individual would not
remain silent where his health was concerned does not necessarily
apply here. Many if not most people do not consider mental illness
as serious as physical illness; consequently the fear of sickness or
death attendant to a physical ailment is not present to aid the
psychiatrist. Furthermore, the patient is not trained in recogniz-
ing significant from insignificant facts. . . . [Drugs are an im-
portant factor, as is the popular regard of mental illness as an
object of ridicule or shame.] Legislation should be mindful of
the fact that the patient should be protected from any such humili-
ation, and further that this in itself evidences the fact that the
patient intends his ailment for the ears of the psychiatrist alone;
this confidence is an essential element of this particular relation-
ship.320
The priest-penitent privilege 27 needs no further consideration than
to note, in passing, that it finds its justification in freedom of religion
and conscience, embodied in the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution and made binding on the states by the expanding inter-
325. See VIII WcmoRE § 2385.
326. Bernstein, Physician-Patient Privilege, Symposinm-Evidcn tiary Privileges
of Non-Disclosure, 33 CONN. B. J. 190, 198-99 (1959).
327. VIII \VItoItR §§ 2394-96.
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pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.328  The First Amendment
represents the embodiment of one of the highest values of our civiliza-
tion. Moreover, as the priest-penitent privilege only results in the non-
disclosure of admissions which in the absence of the privilege would
not likely be made129 - or if made would not be disclosed by priests
in the course of their religious discipline enjoining absolute secrecy -
the writer does not perceive how it can do any substantial harm to the
evidentiary principle. To compel disclosure would seem to run afoul
of the First Amendment and would at best result in a contempt charge
against the disobedient clergyman. Furthermore, the existence of this
privilege must afford a great sense of satisfaction to the members of
those religions in which confidential communications between the
clergy and their laity are prescribed. Few cases have arisen in this
area, and it is difficult to conceive of a case in which opposing counsel
would insist upon a priest or minister's testifying over the personal
objection of the latter, especially in a jury trial.33
The husband and wife situation really consists of two distinct
concepts of privilege, to wit: (1) the privilege of either spouse not to
testify for or against the other spouse except by mutual consent;3.
and (2) the privilege of a spouse not to have a communication made in
confidence to the other spouse disclosed by the latter.332 The former
privilege exists only during the continuation of the marriage; the
latter is of permanent duration.
Contrary to Dean Wigmore, the writer believes that the former
of the two privileges arising out of the marital relationship (referred
to as the anti-marital privilege) is the more valuable and that it would
generally suffice to protect the essential privacy of the relationship,
though there are situations where the desired coverage would be
lacking, due to the factors of divorce and deathY.3 In these circum-
stances, however, the harm done would not tend to be substantial, since
328. See Palko v. Connecticut, 320 U.S. 319 (1937) ; Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947).
329. See Fahey, J., in Mullen v. United States, 263 F. 2d 275, 277-80 (D. C. Cir.
1958), distinguishing the situations in which "the priest is known to be bound to silence
by the discipline and laws of his church" from those in which a penitent confesses to a
minister in his capacity as such in order to obtain spiritual aid but holding both kinds
of confessions to be within the purview of the privilege.
330. See MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEIMS OF EVIDogCE 114 (1954). An interesting
case giving a broad application to the statutory privilege is In re Swenson, 183 Minn.
602, 237 N.W. 589 (1931), with interesting comment in 30 MICH. L. REv. 309 (1931).
For a brief but excellent discussion of this privilege, with bibliography, see Mc-
Laughlin, Priest-Penitent Privilege, in Symposium: Evidentiary Privileges of Non
Disclosure, 33 CONN. B. J. 210 (1959).
331. VIII WIGMORE §§ 2227-45. Wigmore criticizes this privilege.
332. Id. §§ 2332-41. Wigmore approves this-privilege. He distinguishes the two
privileges in § 2334.
333. The UNIFORM RULES rule 23 and rule 28 give the greater weight to the
confidential communication. They also distinguish between civil and criminal cases,
making the privilege slightly broader in the latter than in the former.
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in the case of divorce, the relationship has already been disrupted;
while in the case of death, the original holder will not be in a physical
state to suffer the embarrassment (or disgrace) when disclosure by
the other party to the communication is compelled. As regards either
possibility, during marriage one's personal dignity and freedom can
be threatened only remotely and in the prospective sense. To some
extent there is the policy of preserving domestic harmony, and as a
practical matter this undoubtedly has a certain degree of importance.
But it is probably true that the harmony would not be adversely affected
by the prospect of the spouse's being forced to testify to such confidential
communications after the dissolution of the marriage. The absence of
such a privilege might put the ex-spouse to an unhappy choice of per-
jury or injury to her ex-husband, but could one urge a strong policy
objection to that? In a sense, there might be a greater infringement on
privacy than in the case of the compulsory violation of the confidences
of a friend, but it does not appear that this would generally be the case.
Such special recognition of confidentiality as might be claimed here
would result from the combination of a relation back when considered
from the vantage point of the time when the evidence is sought and of
a projection of the matter into the future (prospective fear of revela-
tion) from the vantage point of the time when the communication is
made. Hence, the situation has an element of delicacy, and there are
both rational and emotional overtones which lend some support to the
privilege. The resolution of the issue must come from a choice of
competing values. We do not like the idea of forcing a choice here
(that is, on the part of the individuals involved), but choices are in-
evitable, and the prospective injury to interests of personality are not
sufficient to tip the scales in favor of the privilege.
Furthermore, if the anti-marital privilege is recognized, the con-
fidential communications privilege is not necessary except in cases of
death or divorce and third party suits, where little harm would seem
to be likely to result. And after the marriage has been terminated, any
public policy favoring the preservation of domestic harmony would not
be applicable here, while the time when the communication channels
should be kept open between the spouses would have already passed.
Actually, the writer submits that the policy favoring the maintenance
of free and easy communications between the spouses is aided very
little by the existence of either privilege. Husband and wife do not
think about the matter,"3 4 and if they did they would have no choice
334. It has been maintained that "[T]he privilege against the disclosure of
marital communications does not actually serve the purposes assigned for its existence.
Few laymen are aware of such a privilege and when informed of it by their attorney,
the resultant invoking of it by them is usually a result of past marital discord, and
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but to proceed much as they do at the present time. There might be
exceptions in the case of various criminal actions, which make such neat
illustrations for the casebook editors, but these are peripheral matters.
Free communications and domestic harmony are essential to the pres-
ervation of the family, but the writer does not believe that a threat to
this institution would exist if the privilege were abolished entirely.
Marriage and the family, perhaps our most dynamic social institutions,
would hardly feel the jolt.
Dean Wigmore's argument for the confidential communications
privilege and against the anti-marital testimonial privilege smacks of
the lampwick of eighteenth century rationalism, and the writer sub-
mits that a justifiable quaere might be this: Did not Wigmore's fervent
desire to eliminate insofar as possible all rules which prevent the
reception of relevant evidence cause him to select the confidential com-
munications privilege over the anti-marital testimonial privilege as the
lesser of two evils? The way one looks at a point might be determina-
tive of the conclusion which one reaches concerning its value." 5
The writer submits that these two privileges rest on a stronger
basis in our society, however. This basis is the concept of human
dignity in connection with an especially confidential relationship, one
incidentally packed with "emotional dynamite" and one which the state
has a strong interest in protecting and fostering. In a personal and
intimate sense the husband and wife relationship is the closest one
known to man. Ideally, it involves a union of minds as well as bodies.
A spouse reveals himself to his marital partner in almost every way
more thoroughly than to others - even when he does so unconsciously.
This intimate relationship is of great worth in the promotion of the
ultimate interests of society. Immediately, the problem is one of the
security of domestic institutions, but behind this is the ultimate interest
of the state in the individual life.
Therefore, private matters occurring in the area of the marital
relationship are not to be brought out lightly in formal public hearings,
such as judicial, legislative, and administrative proceedings. After the
marital relationship has come to an end, the confidential matters are
not so deserving of protection from public scrutiny. Nevertheless,
something in the spirit is shocked and hurt at the betrayal of former
confidences, at the revelation of the secrets of the bed-chamber, and
perhaps at the vindictiveness of alienated ex-spouses, in some cases
to the point of perjury, and at the conduct of fortune hunters, who
not as the rule contemplates, a deterrent to future marital difficulties." Greene, Hus-
band-Wife Privilege, in Synposium: Evidentiary Privileges of Non Disclosure, 33
CoNN. B. J. 182, 190 (1959) (brief but excellent recent treatment of this privilege).
335. See generally PO.ANyI, Tun LOGIC Or LIBERTY (1951), esp. the interesting
examples drawn from science at 12-13.
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make a mockery of the institution of marriage. However, the relation-
ship itself is no longer in existence, and there are other policies com-
peting for recognition, policies which pull in the opposite direction.
One of these is the policy favoring accuracy in fact-finding, which in
general is and should be the strongest one known to the courts, standing
ever-ready to tip the scales when'the weight in the opposing balance
is lightened. The writer therefore advocates that the confidential com-
munications privilege should be qualified by statute to provide that
the court should have the power to allow disclosure after the marriage
has ceased to exist, if it should first be shown that the benefit to be
derived from the disclosure would tend to outweigh the harm which
might tend to result from such disclosure. This would leave a kind of
qualified immunity, to be dissolved upon the showing of good cause.
The anti-marital privilege is limited in the sense that it contains
a healthy exception in certain cases of necessity, such as crimes by
one spouse against the other, and in divorce proceedings. 3" The courts
have rightly refused to extend the confidential communications privi-
lege to cases of communication through agents. As the late Chief
Justice Stone once put it, "Normally husband and wife may conven-
iently communicate without stenographic aid, and the privilege of hold-
ing their confidences immune from proof in court may reasonably be
enjoyed and preserved without embracing within it the testimony of
third persons to whom such communications have been voluntarily re-
vealed. 31 8 7 The two marital privileges are thus of rather limited scope.
Each spouse's testimony is generally available in favor of the other
spouse, especially in cases where other evidence would least likely be
obtainable. On balance, it would seem that these privileges should be
preserved for the protection of privacy as an element of human dignity
in this most intimate of all personal relationships.
D. Termination of the Privilege:
Finally, the question of termination of the privilege should be
considered. (This has already been done in the case of husband and
wife. In the case of priest and penitent, the privilege must be perma-
nent for reasons of religion and conscience and so its termination can-
not reasonably be permitted. In the case of attorney and client, the
rationale seems to be weighted in favor of the termination of the privi-
lege after the death of the communicant, and similar conditions point
to a like conclusion in the case of the physician and patient. Therefore,
we will consider the question of termination of these privileges to-
336. VIII WIGMORt § 2239.
337. Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 16-17 (19.34).
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gether.) Since the privileges are for the protection of human dignity
through formal privacy in a highly personal relationship, the question
arises as to whether that value is destroyed or greatly diminished by
limiting the duration of the privilege to the lifetime of the communicant.
Certainly the value of the privileges is not destroyed, because most of
this value will ordinarily have been received during the communicant's
natural life. Generally, what value remains to be enjoyed by immunity
from compulsory disclosure by the attorney (or by the physician) is
small, and the confidence is seldom subject to challenge. Furthermore,
the dissolution of the privilege here certainly could not embarrass or
disgrace (that is injure in the personal sense) a deceased person, not
even when the court should order the compulsory disclosure of the
communication which had been privileged prior to the death of the
declarant. The factors favoring the right of privacy are the sense of
freedom from fear of injury to expectations arising out of established
relations in the property and contract sense and a sense of freedom from
fear of social disapproval. The latter, however, is personal, in any
strong sense, only to the declarant."' 5 The former is present but only
in a lesser degree (and without the same sense of immediacy) and then
largely in the property and contract sense of privity of relationship
under the laws of ownership and succession. Perhaps the conceptual
notion of privity derived from property and contract had a place in the
thought ways which led to the extension of the privilege to cover cases
after death in the first instance. 39 Certainly, the attorney's sense of
honor was a factor, as this does not cease on the death of the client.
Yet, as has been shown, this sense of honor, though still a factor, is
no longer of controlling importance. The type of thinking which led
to the establishment of rules of competency, the remnants of which are
still with us in the form of the dead-man statutes, 3 40 must have con-
tributed to the permanency of this privilege. But notions of competency
have been discredited, and the rules of privity have no more place
per se in the law of privilege than agency fictions, the fiction of the
corporate personality, or the discredited doctrine of mutuality of
remedy in equity. Based on either notions of human dignity or Wig-
more's lesser rationale, the justification for the privilege is not sufficient
to hold the scales against the strong policy favoring accurate fact-
338. It is clear, however, that fear of social disgrace after death is not an un-
common occurrence, and in situations where this factor creates fear on the part of
the communicant (or would be communicant), the dignity principle continues to have
substantial value.
339. Fear of loss of estates in land after death in England, a country where
landed estates were the prime source of status and power, might have been a factor
originally, but would hardly need to be taken into account in an evaluation of the
privilege in twentieth century urban America.
340. McCoRmiic § 65; II WI,1MORE § 488 at 575.
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finding when the original personal relationship between the client (or
patient) and his professional adviser (or physician) has ceased to
exist by reason of the death of the former. The values which the
privilege tends to accord have been generally fulfilled. Any remaining
value is largely tenuous and uncertain. Hence, when weighed against
the important countervailing values of evidence, which remain con-
stant, they no longer tip the scales in favor of the immunity from dis-
closure. The writer therefore submits that the privilege should be
limited by statute to the life-time of the original communicant.34" By
the same reasoning, the privilege should be personal to the client (or
patient) and should never be transferred to those in privity with him
as a result of contractual relations.4 2
E. New Areas of Development: Corporate and Agency Problems:
There are two other areas in which the privilege is recognized
today wherein there is some cause for uncertainty as to the value of
the privilege when balanced against the need for evidence, and the
matter deserves careful study. These areas are as follows: (1) the
area of communications of corporate agents to corporate counsel; and
(2) the area of communications of agents conducting legal business
for their principals to counsel for such principals. Both areas will be
considered briefly in this subsection. 43
The corporation in the nineteenth century was a small business
operation, frequently personally owned or closely held and having a
large element of the personal relationship in the association of the
principal owners and shareholders with their legal counsel. The rela-
341. See also MCCORMICK § 98, to the same effect. The ethical obligation of non-
disclosure, as embodied in Canons 6 and 37 would remain in effect, however. Cf. 52
A.L.R. 2d 1243 (1954) (propriety and effect of attorney representing interest adverse
to former client).
Professor McCormick favors the termination of the privilege on the death of
the original holder. MCCORMICK 200. A valuable note on California law reaches the
same result. 10 STAN. L. Rgv. 297, 320 (1958). (This note draws the line so as to
favor the privilege slightly more than the writer would favor it in general, but never-
theless the conclusions there reached are fundamentally sound.) And see Comment,
Posthumous Privilege in California, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 606, 616-25, 632-33 (1961)
(generally to same effect).
The writer might also suggest as a possible alternative here a qualified privilege
to be terminated for good cause shown, along the lines suggested for the physician-
patient privilege and the husband-wife confidential communications privilege.
342. The UNIFORM RULES, rule 26(b) adopts this position.
343. These two subjects, to wit: the applicability of the attorney-client privilege
to corporations and to communications between attorney and client through agents,
the investigation of the case made in anticipation of litigation, including the investiga-
tions of the client and the use of agents by the attorney and the client for purposes
other than direct communication, and the ascertainment of expert information and
advice bearing on the problems of litigation will be the subject of two forthcoming
papers by the writer. The paper on corporate privilege will appear in 40 U. DET. L. J.
(1963), under the title of A Personal Privilege for Communications of Corporate
Clients-Paradox or Public Policy?
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tionship of the corporate owners was generally a face to face relation-
ship with counsel in the particular community wherein the corporation
was located and did business. It was on the basis of these conditions
that the extension of the attorney-client privilege to the corporation
appeared both natural and reasonable. In general, this picture no
longer holds true. 44 Many corporations have reached gigantic size,
management is largely divorced from ownership, and the managers
are in the position of trustees for the many and widely dispersed stock-
holders.345 Even those in the positions of top management and their
staffs are not "clients" in the true sense of the word. They are only
agents for the transmission of communications from the corporation
344. Even Wigmore in his great treatise does not notice the problem. The right
of a corporation to the claim of privilege on the same basis as an individual is
tacitly assumed. The only article to appear thus far specifically devoted to the subject
takes the position that the privilege should apply to both outside counsel and house
counsel for corporate bodies. Simon, The Attorney-Clielt Privilege as Applied to
Corporations, 65 YALE L. J. 953 (1956).
Two other articles, valuable for their attempts to brief the law and its present
tenuous distinctions in the area of "work product," are Strack, Attorney-Client
Privilege-House Counsel, 12 Bus. LAW 229 (1957) ; and Hunt, Corporate Law
Department Communications-Privilege and Discovery, 13 VAND. L. REv. 287 (1959).
They collate the decisions and state the law but do not attempt to rationalize it.
345. See BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY,
esp. Ch. 1 of Bk. I and Ch. 4 of Bk. 4. This excellent work traces the rise of the
modern corporation, the gradual separation of management from ownership, the new
corporate institution and its power, and new problems which it poses, with suggestions
for dealing with them.
Analogy is suggested in the treatment of the privilege against self-incrimination,
which in the United States does not extend to a corporation. Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). See also VIII
WIGMORE § 2259a; McCoRMICK § 125. Moreover, the privilege cannot be asserted
personally by an officer-custodian of the corporate records on the ground that they
would tend to incriminate him, inasmuch as he acts only in a representative capacity
in connection with such records. Wilson v. United States, supra. Also the privilege
does not extend to an unincorporated association, and agents of such association in
whose custody the records of the association are reposed can be compelled to produce
such records, although production would tend to incriminate them personally. United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). Recently, the privilege has been held not to
be available to a general partner of a large limited partnership when summoned to
produce partnership records. Silverstein v. United States, 314 F. 2d 789 (2d Cir. 1963) ;
petition for certiorari filed April 25, 1963, Supreme Court No. 1048. The theory of
these cases is that the privilege against self-incrimination is personal to the individual,
being in connection with his individual acts in a personal capacity, whereas, the
employees of the institutions involved in the above-cited cases in the performance of
their work for such institutions were acting in their representative capacities. The
institutions, not being entitled to the claim of privilege, since not within the purview
of the policy on which the privilege is based, it cannot be asserted by anyone. For
our purposes, the important point is that the privilege against self-incrimination is a
personal thing and is not accorded to an institution. By analogy, this should be true
a fortiori in the case of the attorney-client privilege.
In Canada, however, a corporation can claim the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Bell v. Klein, [1954] 1 D.L.R. 225 (1953). (S.C.B.C.) (action of fraud;
privilege available to corporation itself and may be invoked in its behalf) ; Webster
v. Solloway Mills & Co., [1931] 1 D.L.R. 831 (1930). (AIb.) (brokerage contract;
privilege applies; no authority cited). The same rule prevails in England. Triplex
Safety Glass Co. v. Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934), Ltd. [1939] 2 K.B. 395 (C.A.).
The extension of the attorney-client privilege to corporations came before the
development of the giant corporation of the twentieth century, which is entirely
different from the business unit owned by an individual or small group. See BERLE
AND MEANS supra 2. This latter type of group organization was never so deper-
sonalized as is the new corporation of the present century. Id. 9, 352. It was natural
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as "client" to the corporation's lawyers. These agents cannot indi-
vidually determine whether they will seek legal advice and if so what
lawyer or lawyers they will choose to represent their company. They
cannot determine what and how much information they will communi-
cate to counsel. Furthermore, the managerial agents who conduct the
corporate enterprise do not occupy the same type of close personal
relationship with their lawyers as the individual client does with his
lawyer. In the nature of things, the managers cannot occupy the same
kind of relationship because of the vicarious nature of their role of
company representative. The agent ex necessitatae is not the client.
Hence, the personal counselling element, so strong in the relationship of
the individual client with his attorney, is almost entirely absent here. 4 a
The managerial agents cannot determine whether to claim the privilege
originally, nor whether they should waive the privilege later. At
least, they cannot make such determination in their individual or per-
sonal capacities. If they should attempt to do so, such action would
ordinarily be held to be beyond the scope of their authority. All of
these things must be determined by company policy. This policy and
for the courts to analogize the corporation to the individual, since the corporation
represented an extension of individual personality in an area where the courts were
friendly toward the objectives (which situation was not so generally the case when
the privilege against self-incrimination was raised).
Nevertheless, the extension of the privilege in the corporate area is a result of
the conceptualistic type of thinking which was in vogue in the last century and
urged by the historical school of jurists. Once a particular legal concept was formu-
lated, all cases had to be fitted to the concept rather than the concept shaped to meet
the particular needs that arose from the confrontation of new types of situations.
Thus, when the attorney-client privilege had become well established as a legal con-
cept, the modern corporation began its phenomenal growth and development. Jurists
applied the concept automatically, thinking in terms of the concept rather than the
objectives to be accomplished and the interests to be balanced in the particular situa-
tion. Cf. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS O LEGAL HISTORY 119-24 (1923); Radin, A
Re-Statement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. Rgv. 1141, 1144 (1938). Even the great Wig-
more, who had endeavored to re-examine all the evidentiary principles and to deter-
mine. their merit, failed to consider this problem of the applicability of the attorney-
client privilege to the modern corporation.
Finally, it should be noted that - even apart from the non-existence of the
problem of the face to face relationship and the concept of human dignity - the
privilege as applied to the corporation, especially the giant corporation, does not
satisfy Professor Wigmore's four fundamental conditions (discussed in text at note
203 ante). Nor does the fact that management's position may be challenged a gen-
eration later make the corporation any more personal. Rather, as a result of the
gradual shifting of the source of control to investment trusts and other corporate
holding devices, the giant corporation has only become more antonomous and more
impersonal in relation to both the individual shareholder and the public. For a good
discussion of the change that is now taking place, see BERLE, POWER WITHOUT
PROPERTY (1959).
345a. For example, the communications of the corporate agent to counsel can
never fall in the second category set out under practical considerations. See pt. III
337-38 ante. Yet, this category is an important factor in the justification of the
personal privilege and particularly in making it both an unqualified immunity at the
particular time as well as permanent in duration. Hence, it would seem that at best
any privilege accorded to the corporation should only be for the duration of the
particular suit and subject to non-recognition when the opponent otherwise would
not be able to obtain the necessary evidence on which to proceed with his case. 48
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the manner of its execution are the product of staff decisions. The
corporate managers can only carry out this policy.
In the relationship which will exist between the corporation and
its legal advisers, the business element will predominate. Such personal
element as comes to exist must be on an individual basis, between the
corporate managers and their legal advisers as individuals, although
the managers are actually representing their company. Hence, it is
more in the nature of the kind of relationship which exists between
friends and business associates than that which exists in a more formal
sense between the individual client and his attorney. Most of the con-
siderations heretofore discussed in connection with an evaluation of
the personal privilege and the illustrations analyzed are not applicable
in the case of the corporate client-attorney relationship. The very frame
of reference itself is too different. For example, as previously indicated,
the generally accepted rationale of the privilege is the freedom which
it affords to the client to communicate with his attorney without fear
that either party will be forced to disclose such communications at a
later date without the consent of the client. If the privilege did not
exist, this feeling of freedom on the part of the client would be lacking,
and he would not make full disclosure to counsel. Yet, in the case of
the corporate client, the privilege does not have this motivational
effect, since the matter of communications to counsel is a policy matter,
to be determined by the corporate management as a body. An indi-
vidual member of the managerial body can only carry out the policy
as an agent for transmission of communications, according to instruc-
tions, and his personal feelings will not enter into the matter. Hence,
the personal motivational factor is entirely lacking and irrelevant here.
Moreover, in the case of the corporation, the information which would
be communicated to counsel should generally be a part of the corporate
business records and as such subject to pretrial discovery in any event.
It should be pointed out that inasmuch as the client is not a person but
an institution, the high degree of secrecy (confidentiality) which exists
when the client is an individual being cannot exist here, unless the
privilege is restricted to the communications of some single designated
corporate agent, which would, of course, deprive the corporation of
most of the practical benefits presently derived from the recognition of
the privilege.345b Yet, to such extent as the privilege is extended so as
to include communications other than those originating with the indi-
vidual client, the prerequisite confidentiality is lacking. As the writer
345b. See Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the case of General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, No. 831, October Term, 1962; cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). This case is also referred to with additional case history
in note 350a.
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will show hereinafter, communications originating with the client's
agents must necessarily lack the requisite confidentiality to qualify for
the privilege. For example, they fail to meet the first condition for
the recognition of a privilege.8 4 e Moreover, if the shareholders rather
than the managers are deemed to be the group entitled to recognition
as "the client," the communications of the latter could not qualify as
communications of the client even if the requirement of strict con-
fidentiality were relaxed in the case of the corporate client.3 45d Yet,
if the shareholders are not the group which constitute "the client" for
purposes of the privilege but are nevertheless entitled to have access to
the corporate records, the requisite confidentiality is lacking for that
reason. Finally, the visitatorial powers of the state of incorporation
would entitle it to inspect the corporate records, and these records, not
being entitled to confidential treatment, would not originate in con-
fidence since the knowledge sought would be available to third parties
as a matter of law, under another rule of law. 450
As another example, the case of the client going to Attorney A to
ascertain the law and then improving the case which he communicates
to Attorney B would be most unusual action on the part of the corporate
management - in fact, it would be almost inconceivable in the case of
one of the quasi-public corporations. The dignity principle would not
be infringed if the corporate privilege were abolished, since the dis-
closure of corporate matters would constitute no threat to individual
privacy, and no injury to the individual personality would result from
forced disclosure. There could be no conceivable threat in that area,
since individual privacy cannot exist in the area of the relationship of
the members of the corporate management with the corporation. What
the managers do is done for the corporation and hence cannot be private
and confidential as to the individual actor (agent)but only as to the
corporation for which the individual is acting, to such extent as is
permitted by the policy of the law. The element of freedom of the in-
dividual managerial agent is similarly lacking (and irrelevant), since
the agent can have no freedom in the sense of individual freedom of
choice, for the same reason that he can have no privacy and no injury
to personality from compelled disclosure.
The element of loyalty, so important in the case of the attorney
and the individual client, is of a different nature here, since loyalty in
the personal sense must run to the corporate managers, while the obli-
345c. VIII WIGMORE § 2285; discussed in text at note 203 ante.
345d. See Campbell, C.J., in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Co., 207
F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962) ; supplemental opinion in 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill.
1962).
345e. This point was also emphasized by Judge Campbell in Radiant Burners,
supra.
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gation of counsel is to the corporation. Since this is understood by all
parties, the sense of loyalty never develops in the same manner nor to
the same extent as in the case of the individual client and his attorney.
If the managerial agents leave the service of the company, the corpora-
tion as client nevertheless remains in the same relationship, at least
theoretically, with its lawyers. Finally, since in the United States a
corporation is held not to be entitled to the claim of privilege against
self-incrimination, the incrimination element that is generally so im-
portant a part of the privilege in the case of the individual is entirely
non-existent here.
Since the corporation is not a person in the physical sense, the
communications from the client to the lawyer can never originate with
the client in the literal sense of that term (as a term of personification).
The communications can only originate with the client's agents. Hence,
there can never be a true face to face relationship between the corpora-
tion and its lawyers. Yet, this is the only area of the attorney-client
relationship which the writer believes should be recognized as within
the purview of the classical priviledge, and even here it should be
recognized only to such extent as the question is deemed settled by
the principle of stare decisis.3 45
There has also grown up in the present century a new type of
legal adviser to the large corporation, known as "inside counsel" or
"house counsel." Such counsel maintain their offices on the corporate
premises and devote their full time to the handling of corporate matters,
generally for a single corporation that is their full-time employer. Such
counsel handle all legal matters assigned to them by their company
managers, and they may handle a substantial amount of non-legal busi-
ness. Corporate counsel have come to be recognized as a distinct branch
of the corporate enterprise. As an entity, they are customarily referred
to as "the corporate law department." Frequently, such counsel also
occupy high executive positions in the corporations which they simul-
taneously represent as house counsel. They learn about the legal prob-
lems of the businesses which they represent as these problems arise -
not, like outside lawyers, at a later date. All parties ex necessitatae
must accept and work with each other. Hence, all the delicacy, com-
345f. Compare Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association, 207 F. Supp.
771 (N.D. Ill. 1962) ; supplemental opinion in 209 F. Supp. 321 (1962) (refusing to
recognize a corporate privilege), with Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (recognizing corporate privilege on ground that
it has been established practice for too long to be denied by the courts). The writer
submits that the position reached by Judge Campbell on this point in Radiant Burners
is sound. The case is now pending on appeal to the Seventh Circuit. In United States
v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 210 F. Supp. 889 (D. N.J. 1962), an anti-trust case, the
court recognized the corporate privilege, deeming itself bound by the specific language
of the New Jersey Evidence Act. Each of these cases also presents a nice question
of choice of law in the area where substantive law and procedure seem to merge
into each other.
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plexity, subtlety, and changeability of the relationship which exists in
the case of an individual client and his counsel is lacking here, at least
in the same personal-professional sense. The relationship here is much
more stable than even that of the corporation with outside counsel.
House counsel are actually a branch of the corporate management.
Such counsel are in no better position to demand special status as at-
torneys for the purpose of establishing the attorney-client privilege in
this area than any other members of the corporate management would
be to demand a communications privilege for their various corporate
communications and activities. Nevertheless, it has been held recently
that communications to house counsel are within the scope of the privi-
lege.3 40 However, the question is far from settled, it is an open one in
most jurisdictions, and the-writer believes that it would be wise for
the courts to refuse to extend the privilege to cover confidential com-
munications to house counsel.
Thus, there are two basic reasons why the privilege should not
apply to the communications of corporate management to corporate
counsel: (1) The relationship of attorney and client is not personal to
the managers in the same close, individual-personal-professional sense
in which it is personal to the individual client and his lawyer; and (2),
as to the relationship of management with house counsel, this is more
in the nature of an ordinary intracompany relationship than one be-
tween an individual client and his legal adviser in the traditional sense
of the term. The additional reason that corporate communications to
counsel lack the requisite confidentiality is more technical in nature,
yet it cannot be denied that corporate communications to counsel do
not originate in confidence in any close personal sense, or in any
restricted sense such as that of man to man; this is true a fortiori in
the case of communications to house counsel, who is treated as a part
of the institution, whereas, the relationship with an outside lawyer
Wiould be on a more formal professional basis.
The same kind of reasoning would prevent the application of the
privilege to those cases in which defendants in damage suits are repre-
sented by casualty insurance firms. In these cases, according to cur-
rent practice, the attorney actually represents the insurance company,
and the insured is little more than a witness who is bound by the terms
of his contract of insurance to cooperate with the insuring company.
Nevertheless, at the present time, the courts ignore the true relationship
of the parties and treat the insurance counsel as though they were
actually representing the insured, who is only the nominal party de-
346. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 85 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass.
1950); Zenith Radio Corp. v. R.C.A., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954); Georgia-
Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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fendant. When the insured is more than a nominal party, as where
the damage claim may exceed the policy coverage, there is a conflict
of interest between the assured and the carrier, and the assured, in order
to be adequately represented, should have his own personal counsel.
When resort is had to a fictional stretching of the attorney-client rela-
tionship so as to treat the carrier's counsel as counsel for the assured, the
insurance carrier is in effect the windfall beneficiary of an immunity
that is not within the sound policy on which the privilege should be
based. The relationship of the insurance defense counsel to the assured
is not the close personal relationship of attorney and client, and it is
not one which should inure to the benefit of the carrier by virtue of
some kind of magical transference. The insured as agent is in reality
only the agent for the company, for the defense of a lawsuit, as pro-
vided in the contract of insurance. Moreover, the assured is not an
agent of the managerial staff level. He is not even a general agent. He
is a special agent, for a very limited purpose and for a period of short
duration at best. The company does not have the same basis for the
claim of privilege in the case of the insured as it would have in the
case of an ordinary employee of less than staff level. At "low twelve,"
we should now perceive that Cinderella's coach is still a pumpkin and
not insist that it be treated as a coach merely because there are coaches
on the streets.
A fortiori, the privilege should not extend to governmental
bodies3 17 which are more depersonalized than corporations and also
347. The case against the privilege for corporate clients applies a fortiori to gov-
ernmental bodies because these are in a position of trust to all the people, not just
the limited groups of shareholders and creditors. Also, the positions of management
are more impartial and disinterested than is true of corporate management. There is
a public policy of openness of governmental meetings and records and governmental
business in general. In fact, there is a strong public policy favoring the disclosure to
the public of all of the facts pertaining to governmental action. This is true at least
where the national interest would not be jeopardized by threats to governmental
relations with other powers or to internal and external security. Furthermore, this
kind of policy is essential to healthy democratic government, while the government is
able to protect itself adequately in the area of diplomatic relations and military secur-
ity by what has come to be known as governmental privilege. This includes rules
designated both as procedural and substantive.
See McCoRMICK § 92 at 185; cf. VIII WIGMOR8 §§ 2316, 2375; but see Simon
955 n. 9 (contra) ; Rowley v. Ferguson, 48 N.E. 2d 243, syl. 8 (Ohio App. 1942)
(state auditor and attorney general; privilege upheld without discussion) ; Auteny.
Rayner, [19601 1 All E.R. 692; 1 Q.B. 669 (C.A.). (police officer and public prosecutor ;
privilege upheld per broad English Rule) ; Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267
P. 2d 1025 (1954) (city employee to city attorney; privilege assumed) ; Jessup v. Super-
ior Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 102, 311 P. 2d 177 (1957) (city park supt. to attorney for
city; report held privileged in spite of legislative declaration that public records should
be open to inspection). Jessup is the only case in which the matter has been argued,
and even here counsel for the proponent of discovery assumed that the attorney-client
privilege would apply in the absence of the particular statute! See however Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), sup-
plemental opinion in 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962) (excellent opinions, per
Campbell, C. J.), which specifically considered the question and held that historically
the communications privilege did not extend to the corporate client and his attorney,
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face the countervailing policy favoring openness of governmental rec-
ords and proceedings. Moreover, when such records require secrecy,
it is accorded under the public policy which recognizes a privilege for
state secrets. 48 In the case of outside counsel, until recently, it was
generally believed to be the law that the attorney-client privilege extends
to the corporate client. Recent ferment in the area of pretrial discovery,
however, has caused the re-examination of practices which were not
so much established in the judicial sense as they were accepted without
the customary scrutiny which has been the traditional basis on which
the common law was "hammered out" so as to meet the needs of several
great modern nations. The entire question of the applicability of the
privilege to groups of people is now ripe for careful examination no
less than is the same issue in the area of the privilege against self-
incrimination.3 4 ' a Break with established ways and accepted tradition
is always difficult, however, and there may be some justification for
the corporate client and his counsel to be put in a position such that
they can study their case out together without risk of discovery of
their work before they themselves have ascertained what has actually
happened or have decided what their formal legal position will be. The
gravamen of the evil in the twentieth century has been not only that
the voluminous corporate records have masqueraded as communications
to counsel, but also that many important records and documents have
been drafted only as communications to counsel. This last named prac-
tice, of course, technically meets the requirements of the privilege if it
extends to corporations, but the same information should be available
in the corporate records and thus subject to discovery. The history
of discovery of corporate records indicates that this is not the case.
Herein lies the seriousness of the problem for an enlightened system
of evidence. Since change within the legal frame of reference must often
be accomplished piecemeal and gradually, perhaps a qualified immunity
might be the immediate answer in the areas of both corporate and gov-
ernmental "attorney-client" relationships. In the long run, however,
the personal privileges as substantive rights accorded to corpprate and
governmental bodies simply cannot be justified under a scientific system
of evidence.
Mention has already been made of the development of the common
law privilege to cover the communications of clients to their attorneys.
This includes the communications made either directly to counsel or
that nothing contained in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court or the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals requires the recognition of the privilege, and that
accordingly the privilege covers only the communications of the individual client to
his lawyer.
348. See VIII WIGMORt §§ 2367-79; MCCORMICK §§ 143-50.
348a. See note 345, paragraph two.
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through the use of agents for purposes of transmission of the client's
communications. This is the scope of the classical privilege in its essen-
tial area, and the writer has designated it as the face to face situation,
in contrast with the extended privilege, which covers a larger but more
indefinite area and one in which the decisions continue to be in conflict.
The quasi-privilege has also been mentioned. It is an immunity
which has come to be recognized for the lawyer's preparation for trial.
The lawyer will not be required to disclose the information which he
has acquired in preparation of his case in advance of the trial. In other
words, the lawyer's knowledge of the case and the evidence, which he
has obtained personally or through his agents, are not subject to pre-
trial discovery. This principle can also be conceded to have some basis
for claim to validity in an adversary system, though the general sub-
ject of quasi-privilege, except where it connects with the classical privi-
lege, is beyond the scope of this paper. The confusion which has devel-
oped in the law of privilege, however, has resulted from the failure of
the courts, particularly in the United States (but nevertheless traceable
to English precedent) to recognize the distinction between the classical
privilege and quasi-privilege. There are areas where the two principles
overlap. For example, when the lawyer interviews the client in con-
nection with litigation, the information which the lawyer acquires is
protected under the principle of quasi-privilege, as a part of the lawyer's
preparation. It is also protected under the classical privilege, as a com-
munication of the client to his counsel. Beyond this narrow area,
however, there is a tendency for the two principles to diverge. When
the client sends a message to counsel, it is protected under the privilege.
When the lawyer interviews a witness, it is protected under the quasi-
privilege. In England, when the busy lawyer came to use agents to
investigate the case, their investigations were properly protected under
the quasi-privilege. However, the client himself and his agents came
to be recognized as agents of the lawyer. This raised a series of special
problems, such as when the client was investigating as client and when
he was investigating as agent for the attorney. The privilege of the
client is broader than the quasi-privilege of the lawyer because it, the
former, covers all of the writings which originate as communications
by the client to counsel, either for purposes of obtaining legal advice
or for purposes of litigation, while the quasi-privilege of the lawyer
includes only materials gathered by the lawyer in preparation for
litigation.
The tendency of modern business to operate entirely on the basis
of written records was another factor which tended to promote con-
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fusion in the delimitation of the boundaries of the law of privilege. As
the clients came to make a record of the facts in those cases in which
litigation might conceivably be anticipated, their lawyers began to
advance the claim that all such records had been made in anticipation
of litigation. Thus, it came about that these records, which were in
the nature of business records and made in the ordinary course of busi-
ness or would have been made for business purposes in any event,
were claimed to have been made in anticipation of litigation and were
therefore privileged. Though the parties might have claimed, with
greater credibility, that the particular records were made .to be laid
before counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal advice thereon, this
claim does not seem to have been generally made. 48 b
In time, the English courts came to pay little attention to the
origin of the immunity, while the American courts, until recently, seem
not to have realized that there are two distinct privileges involved.
Hence, they have treated all investigations of the client as "communi-
cations" to counsel if they were of the opinion that the records did not
qualify as ordinary business documents. They have also allowed the
independent communications of the client's agents (that is, those not
originating with the client personally) to be treated as privileged com-
munications by the client, thus extending the privilege beyond the more
narrow confines of the face to face situation. This has probably been
due to the failure to recognize that the agents' independent communica-
tions should be protected only when they are obtained by the lawyer
or his agents and then under the principle of quasi-privilege rather than
348b. This was obviously because only communications which originated with
the client personally were protected under the personal privilege, whereas evidence
gathered by the attorney or his agents was protected under the quasi-privilege. Hence,
the evidence gathered by the client's agents in anticipation of litigation was protected
under the quasi-privilege; since the client was treated as agent of the attorney (the
client's agents then being the attorney's subagents). The end result was that materials
which the client's agents communicated to counsel for purposes of litigation were
recognized as privileged, though the materials did not originate with the client (but
only with his agents). The courts then tended to forget the distinction between
privilege and quasi-privilege and to treat the materials gathered or prepared by the
client's agents as privileged if such materials had their origin in the client's anticipa-
tion of litigation, even though the client did not have an attorney at the time when
the source materials were gathered by the .client's agents. The result is that we have
a situation that would have been wholly untenable if the original nature of the pre-
paratory quasi-privilege had been kept clearly in mind. That it was not kept clearly
in mind meant that the courts could treat the personal privilege as covering the
source materials gathered by the client's agents for communication to counsel, and
the claim of privilege for such materials was exercised in all circumstances where it
might conceivably be found by the courts to apply, while the courts themselves applied
the expanding coverage broadly or liberally.
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the classical privilege itself.34sc This is the general background of the
situation which existed when Hickman v. Taylor349 was decided.
Hickman v. Taylor349a is the great American case on privilege and
the leading case dealing with agency problems in the law of attorney-
client privilege. In this case, the Supreme Court refused to apply the
privilege broadly (as the American state courts had done) so as to
cover "communications" made by the client's agents (at least his non-
managerial agents) to the attorney in the course of the attorney's in-
vestigations for trial. Instead, the Court recognized a qualified im-
munity from discovery of "the work product of the lawyer," by which
is meant the fruits of the lawyer's evidence-gathering and legal research
in preparation of the client's case for trial. The Court thus recognized,
for the first time in this country, the distinction between privilege and
quasi-privilege. The holding dealt with the nature of the quasi-privilege
in the context of pretrial discovery, with particular reference to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court refused to make the
quasi-privilege "absolute," in the sense that once the privilege attaches
the information can never be disclosed unless the client consents to
the disclosure or otherwise waives the privilege. Rather, it held that
the information acquired by the attorney might be disclosed if the
opponent could show "good cause" therefor, by which the Court meant
a strong need on the part of the proponent of discovery for the ascer-
tainment of the particular information in connection with the prepara-
tion of his own case for trial. In this respect, the decision is not
definitive. It left open the exact scope of the term "the work product
of the lawyer," and it failed to define clearly what it meant by the term
"good cause," and the relationship of this term, if any, to the identical
term in Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the
Court also mentioned in its decision. Hence, these areas have been
the source of much subsequent disputation by counsel and diversity of
opinion among the lower federal courts.
In what might be described as the most important dictum in the
American law of privilege, the Court restricted the personal privilege
348c. As the result of the failure to recognize this distinction, the American courts
have consistently refused to recognize the privilege as covering the communications
of third parties (non-agents of the client) ; yet, under the principle of quasi-privilege,
the English courts have had no difficulty in reaching that result. In this connection,
it should be pointed out that the fact of employment by the client should be of no
significance. Nor should the fact that the client has actually or impliedly instructed
the employee to convey the information to counsel be significant. The only significant
thing is whether the agent conveys a message from the client to the lawyer (privilege)
or as an investigator-agent of the attorney obtains information for the attorney in
preparation for litigation (quasi-privilege). Of course, if the privilege is expanded
to cover communications originating with the client's agents, it should only extend to
those instances in which the agent is acting in the scope and course of authority from
the client to ascertain (or formulate) the information and transmit it to counsel.
349. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
349a. Ibid.
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as such to the face to face situation, what the client says to his lawyer
directly or through agents acting as mere mechanical aids to communi-
cation.35 However, the employees whom counsel had interviewed were
not agents with authority from their employer to communicate their
original source knowledge, as eye-witnesses, to counsel, nor were they
corporate agents of the managerial or staff level, with implied general
authority to communicate with counsel when they might deem it in
the best interest of the firm for them to do so. The Court did not
directly consider the problem which communications to counsel by
agents in these categories would raise. A distinguished federal district
court has more recently considered the matter and held that the com-
munications of agents of the staff level, made in the course of their
regular duties to counsel are privileged in the classical or common law
sense.""0~ The future scope of the privilege in this important area is
obviously yet to be definitively determined. The writer believes that
the dictum of the Supreme Court literally (and hence strictly or
narrowly) construed would constitute the proper scope of the classical
privilege, as heretofore indicated, since this interpretation would pre-
serve the essence of the personal nature of the relationship of attorney
and client in the area of confidential communications without losing to
the courts much valuable information which will be lost if the privilege
is applied more broadly - as it has been unknowingly applied during
the past seventy-five years. Perhaps the rule of qualified immunity is
also a sound solution to the proper balancing of interests in an area
where the relationship between the attorney and the client is more
impersonal and less subject to damage by disclosure or the constant
threat of disclosure than in the area of the classical privilege. Recent
developments, however, indicate that there are equally sound if not
more practicable solutions."5 '
350. The Court summarily disposed of the argument that the privilege protected
reports involved in the case from discovery (here statements of witnesses who were
employees of the client were taken by the attorney). The Court said:
"For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the protective cloak of this
privilege does not extend to information which an attorney secures from a
witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation. Nor does this
privilege concern the memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings pre-
pared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting the client's case; and it is
equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions or legal theories." 329 U.S. 495, 508.
350a. Wyzanski, J., in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). Compare Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (limited scope of corporate privilege to the com-
munications of corporate agents having authority to waive privilege) ; mandate denied
in same case by Third Circuit sub. non. General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312
F. 2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962) ; cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
351. That is perhaps the most significant point to be drawn from Greyhound Corp.
v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P. 2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961), and com-
panion cases. This is the great American case on discovery. It is discussed at some
length in Agency Problems III and briefed in the Appendix II therein. (op. cit. notes
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The state courts have generally been less liberal in allowing dis-
covery and have construed the privilege more broadly than the federal
courts since the adoption of the federal rules." 2 Nor has Wigmore
brought to this area of the law his usual high degree of learning, in-
sight, and logical analysis.353 As a result, there is still much confusion
in the decisions. Yet the trend is in the direction of confining the
privilege more narrowly as regards the activities of the agents of both
clients and attorneys. This is due to the combination of open discovery
and the guiding light of Hickman v. Taylor, which, as pointed out
above, has tended to consign the privilege itself to its proper area;
namely, the face to face situation.54 This decision, in thus articulating
133, 343). But see Pruitt, Lawyer's Work Product, 37 CAL. B. J. 228 (1962), for
the view that Greyhound is unsound.
352. The state court cases cited in note 71 ante are among the leading cases
illustrative of this proposition. It may be well summarized by the statement that
communications from the client's agent are entitled to the protection of the privilege.
Though the rule as thus stated is too broad, it is the majority rule today. See 139
A.L.R. 1250 (1942), citing cases.
The other side of the coin is represented by the cases where the attorney's agent
makes the communication. When he serves as a medium of transmission for com-
munications of the client, the matter should be privileged, but when he is a fact
gatherer, the evidence should not be privileged (in the classical sense) ; and this
should be true even if the attorney assumes the role of his own investigator, which was
basically the situation in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
The cases also hold that a report or communication from the agent to his prin-
cipal is privileged if made for purposes of litigation (see 146 A.L.R. 977 [1943] and
cases cited). It is here that the time element becomes important to separate the
privileged items from the ordinary business reports and communications. The English
courts have two healthy devices for protection here that American jurisdictions which
go beyond the face to face situation in granting the privilege might do well to con-
sider. They are the requirement of an affidavit of privilege by the solicitor for the
claimant when challenged by the opponent; if the court so desires, it may inspect a
written document to ascertain if it is actually privileged as claimed. See Westminster
Airways, Ltd. v. Kuwait Oil Co., [1951] 1 K.B. 134 (C.A.), 22 A.L.R. 2d 648, a
case involving both the affidavit and the demand for inspection.
353. VIII WIGmORE §§ 2317-21.
354. Recent case history in several states would seem to bear this out. For a
good illustration, see WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EvIDENcE 459 (1958). The Supreme
Court of California, however, in Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355,
364 P. 2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961), and companion cases, recently held otherwise.
Affirming the scope of the privilege as delimited in the Holm case (communications
of the client's agents to counsel are protected), it held that the investigative activities
of the client's agents and the attorney's agents are not protected generally (as in the
case of third party witnesses' statements) and that the work product doctrine does
not exist in California.
See Thompson v. Harris, 355 Mo. 176, 195 S.W. 2d 645, 166 A.L.R. 1425 (1946).
Here the court refused to allow inspection of plaintiff's statement and third party
witness statements obtained by defendant's investigator under a statute which allowed
discovery of "evidence material to any matter involved in the action," on the theory
that these items would not be admissible on behalf of plaintiff except for purposes
of impeachment. And see Annot., 166 A.L.R. 1425 (1947).
Illinois avoided the problem by adopting a rule of court similar to the quasi
privilege aspect of the English rule of privilege. Rule 19-5 of the Supreme Court
Rules provides that disclosures of "memoranda, reports or documents made by or for
a party in preparation for trial . . . shall not be required through any discovery
procedure." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.19-5 (1959). Thus, evidence falling in
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the distinction between privilege in the classical sense and quasi-
privilege, has not only performed an important service through the
liberalization of the scope of federal pretrial discovery, but it has also
made the bench and bar aware of the fact that they have hitherto been
confusing two privileges of diverse origin and nature and dealing with
them as one and the same thing. Nowhere has the law gone forward
more blindly - and hence with difficulty of pronouncement that has
made its ultimate clarification heretofore impossible - than here. As
a result of the success of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
gradual acceptance on the part of the bar of the work product principle
of the Hickman case, the scope of the area of quasi-privilege and the
degree of its immunity are being worked out more knowingly, and the
cause of open discovery is now making great headway in the state
jurisdictions which have modernized their discovery procedures.
In criminal proceedings, the federal courts are free to follow their
own view of the common law in defining evidentiary privilege.3 5  In
civil cases, the choice is not so clear. Hickman v. Taylor was a non-
diversity of citizenship (Jones Act) case; hence, the question of the
applicability of state law of privilege did not arise. In diversity juris-
diction cases, the question arises as to whether the federal courts are
free to develop their own rules of privilege, within the purview of the
Hickman principles, or whether they must apply the state law of privi-
lege as stated in the judicial decisions. The answer to this question
turns upon the interpretation of Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. This is a rule pertaining to the admissibility of evi-
dence and refers to the state law. Some writers believe that since Rule
43(a) is a rule of admissibility and not of exclusion, evidence is ad-
missible if it meets any one of three tests of admissibility set out in the
rule.3 56 Professor Moore takes the position that the issue turns upon
whether the privilege is a matter of substantive law or procedure.
3 57
He further maintains that the privileges are procedural rules and so
the federal courts are entitled to develop their own rules of admissi-
bility." ' Actually, the lower federal courts are divided, with perhaps
this category is admissible at the trial and is not privileged in the technical sense.
Under this provision, trial preparation in Illinois requires a broader immunity than
that which exists in the federal courts. Corboy, Discovery' Practice-Documents,
Tangible Articles, Real Estate, (1959) ILL. L. F. 773, 786-87; see also Keegan,
Privileged Matters and Protective Orders, (1959) ILL. L. F. 801, 805.
355. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.
356. See Green, The Admissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rules, 55 HARV.
L. Rcv. 197 (1941) ; 4 MOORE 26.23 [9].
357. Id. at 1152. This is on the basis of the Erie doctrine (Erie RR. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 [1938]).
358. 4 MooRE 26.23 [9] at 1152. But see Louisell 110-11, 118, 120-23 et passim
(contra) ; text at note 231.
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a majority following the state law .3  The several possible views have
been well summarized as follows:
Able commentators have asserted variously: that the federal courts
must defer to state privileges in all cases, diversity and non-
diversity; that the federal courts are constitutionally bound to
apply state privileges in diversity cases but not in other litigation;
that it is normally desirable to honor and apply state privileges
but the federal court is not compelled to do so; that the federal
courts should follow state law where it denies a privilege but not
where it grants one; and that the history and judicial holdings
are so inclusive that no authoritative answer is yet possible.359
F. New Areas of Infringement: Eavesdropping:
There is an exception to the personal privileges for communica-
tions overheard by third parties.36 It is sometimes referred to as the
eavesdropping exception. It does not require that communications
which have been overheard shall be divulged by the client or his attor-
ney, but rather it provides that such overheard conversations may be
testified to by the third party. Wigmore supports this exception on
the ground that the means of insuring confidentiality are in the hands
of the client and that the preservation of the privileges does not require
the silencing of the third party. 61 Yet if the communicant does not
know that the third party is present, is not the former being penalized
for his negligence? And if the communicant took reasonable pre-
cautions not to be overheard, is he not being deprived of a substantial
legal right without any justification in law? Even under Wigmore's
rationale of the privilege, the possibility of eavesdropping might to
some extent interfere with full and free disclosure by the client to his
attorney, and regardless of whether it actually does deter full dis-
closure, it nevertheless remains a trap for the naive and the unwary, and,
perhaps, also for those who cannot help themselves. 62
359. 4 MooRE ff 26.23 [9]. The Ninth Circuit recently adopted the view that
state law controls in civil cases (law of the forum), even in tax cases arising under
federal law. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d 623 (1960).
For a valuable discussion of the choice of law problem generally see Weinstein,
Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another Jurisdiction, 56 Col..
L. REv. 535 (1956).
359a. 2B BARRON AND HOLTzoFv, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 967 at 242 (1961).
360. VIII WIGMORE § 2326 (attorney-client); § 2339 (marital relations). And
see Functional Overlap 1244-45; Note, Privileged Communications as Affected by
the Presence of Third Parties, 36 MicHi. L. REv. 641 (1939).
361. VIII WIGIAORE § 2326.
362. The UNIFORM RULES eliminate this exception from the attorney-client
privilege. Rule 26 (1) (ii) provides that when the information is obtained "in a
manner not reasonably to be anticipated by the client" the privilege is not lost. While
this would require interpretation, it presumably was meant to include eavesdropping
generally. The writer believes that it would be so interpreted and that the provision
is sound.
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Eavesdropping is a bad, immoral, unethical, degrading thing.
Recognition of the eavesdropping exception to some extent makes the
state a party to these unethical activities. Moreover, such an exception
unfairly penalizes the characters who are of too elevated a mind to
suspect that it might be taking place, as well as the persons who cannot
take precautions against it, the naive and the weak. It is an unfair and
unwarranted intrusion upon one's right to privacy, and this is especially
true when the expectation of privacy arises out of the attorney-client
relationship, which is given special recognition and protection by the
state in the form of the privilege of confidentiality. For the state to
permit this exception is to unexpectedly take back part of what it has
given; to violate the rules of the game, so to speak. Moreover, the
eavesdropping exception is a clear contradiction on a small scale of the
principle embodied in the privilege on a larger scale, that is, the prin-
ciple of human dignity and inviolate personality." 3 The eavesdropping
exception should therefore be eliminated as unwise and unjust.
Furthermore, the problem becomes more urgent when the elec-
tronic devices of modern science are illicitly used to obtain the confi-
dential information, both because they are difficult to detect, and be-
cause they are used in reckless disregard of the law. To condone the
use of evidence obtained through the use of these devices would con-
stitute a threat to all confidential communications in the future.3 4
(Shades of the police state and George Orwell's 1984!) Therefore, it
is believed that brief mention should be made here of the recent history
of such scientific eavesdropping in our courts.
The Coplon case3"' recognized the right to counsel as fundamental
and held that where the Federal Bureau of Investigation had listened
in on the telephone conversations of the defendant and her counsel,
prejudice would be presumed. Unless the state could show that it had
not benefitted directly from this listening, the defendant must go free.
The result seems fair and reasonable and consonant without traditional
concepts of freedom and justice. The wire-tapping which had been de-
clared "dirty business" in a famous dissent in the first instance366 was
finally held to infringe other constitutional rights under more shocking
circumstances. But is the relationship invaded there more deserving
363. An extreme case illustrative of the injustice of this rule is Clark v. State,
159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W. 2d 339 (1953), discussed in text at note 153, ante.
364. The best discussion which the writer has found of the practical aspects of the
problem is contained in the Report of the California Senate Judiciary Committee on
the Interception of Messages by the Use 'of Electronic and Other Devices (1957).
The best discussion of the implications of the threat to privacy from the use of modern
science is that of Lasswell op. cit. note 246 at 121-42.
365. Coplon v. United States, 191 F. 2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951); cert. denied, 342
U.S. 926 (1954).
366. Holmes, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928).
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of protection than that of husband and wife ?367 And if it is a violation
of the law to invade the area of confidential relations, why should any
invasion be countenanced? The answer might be that in cases of in-
fringement on the right to counsel the infringement is more direct and
immediate. Other privileged relationships merely affect the collection
of evidence, but in the Coplon case, the reprehensible conduct affected
the actual management of the trial itself.
3 68
In the Lanza case,36 9 the Court refused to extend the privilege by
the use of injunctive relief so as to prohibit disclosure of privileged
communications between the client and his counsel by a legislative
committee which had "bugged" the conference while Lanza was in
prison. The case has been severely criticized by the New York Bar.
Certainly, any policy behind the privilege demanded the protection of
the privilege in that instance, and the technical argument that the courts
do not have power to enjoin a legislative body is doubtful, for courts
for many years have been enjoining governmental officials as private
citizens when they overstep the proper bounds of official action.370 In
a subsequent opinion, however, the Supreme Court of New York has
held that the state will be denied "a fruit of the poisonous tree," '' that
is, counsel's testimony on a matter not privileged but for which the
lead was first obtained from the recording of Lanza's privileged con-
versation. 37
2
The case of In re Bull 37 3 involved the lawyer's communication to
the client. Here, the lawyer mailed a letter to his client in jail, express-
ing lack of confidence in taking an appeal from the client's conviction
because the trial judge had doctored the transcript of the evidence and
also had a friend on the appellate court. The letter was intercepted by
the jailor and turned over to the court, which summarily disbarred
counsel from further practice before that particular federal district
court. In a subsequent hearing of the matter before another judge,
367. See Irvine v. California, 342 U.S. 128 (1954) (invasion of privacy of a
home by unlawful entry, installation of electronic eavesdropping device, listening to
conversations, including privileged marital communications; use of this evidence held
not to violate due process). The decision was 5-4 for affirmance of the state court
conviction. Two judges dissented on the ground that the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment had violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed
by the fifth amendment and incorporated into the fourteenth amendment (minority
view) ; two judges, on the ground that the conduct was prohibited by the Rochin
doctrine.
368. The Coplon case originated in the federal courts, but the language used is
broad enough to cover similar situations which might arise in state courts.
369. Lanza v. New York State Joint Legislative Committee, 3 N.Y. 2d 92, 143
N.E. 2d 772, 164 N.Y.S. 2d 9 (1957) (4-3 decision, with three dissenting opinions).
370. This was pointed out by the dissenters, with citation of authority. No addi-
tional citations are necessary.
371. See Frankfurter, J., in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
372. In re Lanza [Matter of Reuter], 4 App. Div. 2d 252, 164 N.Y.S. 2d 534
(1957).
373. 123 F. Supp. 389, 392 (D. Nev. 1954).
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the Court refused to recognize that counsel's rights had been violated
because of the security regulations of the prison, which reasonably
required the examination of the prisoners' mail. Since there had been
no communication of the client to counsel to which the intercepted
letter of the latter was a reply, the court deemed that the attorney-
client privilege was not involved. The proceeding was dismissed,
however, to protect the right of defendants in custody to consult freely
with their counsel. It would seem that the attorney in this instance
should be entitled to protection under a substantive rule of privilege
similar to the privilege which exists in the law of defamation. Further-
more, the jailor violated his duty in exposing this privileged communi-
cation, which did not affect the security of the prison, to the very party
against whom the criticism was directed."7 4 The behavior of the orig-
inal judge, which was unjudicial to say the least, illustrates the im-
portance of protecting the entire area of personal relations when ex-
posure does not serve an important purpose.
The shocking thing about most of these cases is that the law
enforcement officials would so brashly and openly violate the law and
then use the fruits of their ill-gotten gains in the courts of law, and that
the state has done nothing to penalize this conduct, the fruits of an
era of infringement on privacy since Olmstead.""5 It is only since the
law enforcement officers have begun to strike near home, on the "pri-
vate domain" of the lawyers as a class, that genuine concern has been
evinced by the New York Bar." 6 Certainly any policy behind the
privileges is defeated when rules permitting the reception of evidence
obtained by eavesdropping are recognized. The same is true of evidence
admitted under the waiver theory when the waiver is only technical,
though here one runs into competing policies of the law in situations
where the concept of fairness may require the working of an estoppel
374. MCCORMICK § 93 at 186 argues against allowing the privilege to cover
advice given by the lawyer to the client, unless offered to show circumstantially what
the client said to the lawyer or as an implied admission. Wigmore agrees with this
viewpoint. VIII WIGMORE § 2320. Minter v. Priest, [1929] 1 K.B. 655 (C.A.), criti-
cized in Note, 43 HARV. L. RiV. 134 (1929), recognized a privilege for defamatory
statements made by the lawyer in declining employment and sought to be proved as
a basis for an action for slander against the lawyer. The writer submits, however,
that this would fall under substantive privilege.
Some statutes draw the curtain over matters generally of which the attorney
has gained knowledge by virtue of the relationship (set out in VIII WIGMORE § 2292
n. 2). MCCORMICK § 93 at 187 criticizes this as obstructive, carrying the privilege
beyond that justified by policy, probably a carry-over from the days when the privilege
was for the protection of the attorney's honor. This position is sound.
375. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). For discussion of the
legal aspects of the general problem aside from the problem of privilege, see Mc-
CORMICK § 142; DASH et al., THE EAVESDROPPERS Part III (1959), with excellent
bibliography. See also note 389 post, pointing out a recent change in the decisional
law of far-reaching significance.
376. E.g., see Waldman and Silver, The Ethics, Morals, and Legality of Eaves-
dropping, 9 BROOKLYN BARRISTER 147 (1958).
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or where consent which could not fairly be revoked has been obtained
previously, for to some extent the eavesdropping exception is a form
of the waiver principle, and the two problems must be noted together.
The striking injustice is only illustrated more dramatically when the
refined devices of an era of electronics are the means used. But there
is a finer principle involved here; namely, the notion that justice by
definition requires fair play, the use of honorable means to achieve its
ends or goals. We degrade both humanity and the law when we make
the law and its agencies parties to lawless conduct. 3" We violate the
great rule of ethics that humanity, including oneself, should always be
treated as an end in itself rather than a mere means to an end.37 We
put ourselves in a class with the police state that we have recently
fought to overthrow. We lessen the respect of both the criminal and
the law-abiding citizen for our law, we encourage cynicism, we create
grounds for psychological rationalization of criminal conduct, and we
defeat justice by contradicting it. Thus, we frustrate the ordering of
an ideal relation among men. 79
VI
CONCLUSION
"Fermat's Last Theorem" has never been solved, but it has re-
sulted in much serious mathematical thought and the discovery of
other valuable problems and solutions. 3 0 Thus progress is ever made.
The writer is reminded of the intriguing history of this theorem when
he reflects that he began his research in the field of privilege with the
tentative belief that all of the personal privileges in general were not
justifiable and should be restricted wherever possible, except perhaps
the attorney-client privilege when necessary to fully carry out the
policy behind the privilege against self-incrimination. 38 ' He has now
377. See Hall, Police and Law in Democratic Society, 28 IND. L. J. 133 passim
(1953).
378. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITTINGS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 80 (Beck transl. 1949). The corollary of Kant's famous categorical
imperative is also discussed in CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO To HEGEL
329-93 (1949).
379. This does not mean, however, that wire-tapping should not be legalized
under proper restrictions and used in the processes of crime detection. See DASH
et al., THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959) (fairly impartial); Savarese, Eavesdropping and
the Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 263 (1960) (succinct summary of recent developments);
Symposium--The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: Reflections on 'The Eaves-
droppers,' 44 MINN. L. REV. 813-940 (1960). The answer to this problem will require
further study.
380. See 2 STRUIK, A CONCISE HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 144-45 (1948)
KASNER AND NEWMAN, MATHEMATICS AND THE IMAGINATION 187-89 (1940).
381. This was not the result of his personal experiences in the private practice of
law. Rather, it was the result of his study of the law of evidence under two truly
great teachers of this subject (thus again proving the old axiom that taught law is
hard law). The writer's personal experiences were not generally focused upon the
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reached a somewhat different conclusion, namely: that in the areas
where interests of personality and dignity are seriously involved, the
privileges have a renewed vitality, that the true justification and
rationale has been adumbrated and only that in the recent writings re-
flective of the changing mores and maturing values of twentieth cen-
tury western democratic culture.3 82  The classical reasons given to
justify the privileges are only partial and inadequate in that they
represent only facets of the broader foundation on which the privileges
must rest in society as it exists today. The privileges can be justified
only on the basis of a maturing social ethos which has given rise to
the concept of human dignity and inviolate personality.
The writer has shown that the scope and rationale of the privileges
cannot be settled by resort to authority, reason, history, or convenience
- though these are entitled to consideration. The humanitarian values
have first claim. 313 As has been said previously, our judicial procedures
nmst be evaluated with reference to the substantive rights we are en-
deavoring to secure;384 and as society progresses, new rights press for
recognition and come to be accepted. Bentham has been proven wrong;
Wigmore and Radin inadequate. Social change upsets settled legal
notions, just as new power centers destroy old balances of power in the
political world. The difficulty here has arisen from the mechanical ap-
plication of old rules to new situations at a time when we were changing
from a simple rural society to a complex urban society, and from the
unquestioning acceptance of the reasoning advanced by a great ana-
lytical scholar at a time when the re-examination of the problem had
become necessary. Principles which have worked well in one context
do not necessarily work well in another,385 and the writers on evidence,
with their sights trained especially on the technical excresences of the
problem, have not been without cause for alarm. The resultant diffi-
culties have been made more urgent by the pressing need for simplifica-
tion of our legal procedures, including the rules of evidence - and the
technicalities or the philosophy of privilege, but he did acquire the "intutitively felt
need" which is common to the private practitioner. See also Functional Overlap
1236-37.
382. The writer does not pretend to have solved the problem because no problem
can be solved when the solution is based on a value judgment on which reasonable
men can be expected to differ considerably. He does believe that he has offered the
best rationale for the satisfactory solution and reasonable delimitation of the problem
for the time being. Other writers should improve upon this solution or show it to be
in error. Further judicial consideration of the matter would also help.
383. Cf. Louisell, 123 n. 103: "The Moral importance of the individual and hence
social significance of confidentiality in at least certain communications, e.g., husband-
wife, would seem to increase with 'the intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon
advancing civilization'...."
384. Loc. cit. note 11, ante.
385. Dean Pound has demonstrated this brilliantly in connection with abstract
notions of free individual self-assertion in the constitutional area of "liberty of con-
tract." See Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALx L. J. 454 (1909).
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parallel need for a broad and effective set of pretrial discovery pro-
cedures - in this day when the impersonality of the city makes evi-
dence difficult to obtain and the congested court calendars frequently
amount to a denial of justice through "the law's delays." The issue has
been further confused by conditions in which many rules of evidence
were archaic and required drastic revision if not elimination.
The preservation and encouragement of personal security is pro-
moted by the maintenance of a well balanced privilege for the com-
munications of attorney and client. The elimination of the methods of
the third degree - which follow in the wake of the depersonalized
efficiency of the modern police organizations - demands a more string-
ent enforcement of the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights. It
demands the extension and enforcement of the laws which recognize
and uphold the rights of freedom and privacy, the right of the individual
to be free from unnecessary interference in his personal and private
life by the machinery of politically organized society, the state. The
crime detection methods of modern science, which intrude no less on
individual freedom and privacy than do other parts of our twentieth
century culture, point up the urgent need for the protection of the indi-
vidual in his personal anonymity. Here, the privilege has a vital role
to play in the counterbalancing of the rights of the individual qua
individual against those of the state as the aggregate of individuals
politically organized for the common good. On the constitutional level,
the above-indicated interferences with freedom have been condemned
as violative of "those canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples." ' 6 The individual is
always entitled to the recognition in his life of those minimal safe-
guards against the state that are "of the very essence of a scheme of
ordered liberty." 8 ' In this respect, it should be pointed out that the
protections afforded by the federal bill of rights are considered minimal.
They are constitutional rights, based on the ethical notions of the
eighteenth century, which though it worshipped at the shrine of reason,
had in actuality no tradition of the higher ethical values of the twentieth
century as a part of the general social ethos. Nevertheless, the attorney-
client privilege, through the right to counsel as embodied in the Sixth
Amendment, and the priest-penitent privilege, under the free exercise
of religion in the First Amendment, now operative on the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, would seem to enjoy constitutional pro-
tection, the former only in part but the latter in toto.
386. Frankfurter, J., in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
387. Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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Today, the privileges are justified by both reason and experience.
The privilege against self-incrimination is not considered as essential
to due process of law, but there is a strong minority of our Supreme
Court justices who would hold otherwise 8 8 Nevertheless, this privilege
is recognized in its most essential principles in all of the state juris-
dictions. The privilege against unlawful search and seizure is recog-
nized as essential to due process but still not the method used to enforce
itas9 except perhaps where the principle of inviolability of the person
has been disregarded.9 ' The right to counsel, at least in capital cases,
the right to a fair trial, and the notion that courts must not act in a
way that is arbitrary or shocking are now treated as constitutional
rights. They have become a part of due process of law. Opposed to
these claims are other claims based on the social interest in the security
of political institutions and the social interest in the security of person
and property from violent or antisocial conduct, interests which are
likewise entitled to be accorded great weight. Therefore, interests in
this area must be balanced on the constitutional level. But outside of
the area of civil liberties, the preservation of human dignity does not
demand so high a price. Thus, outside of the area of criminal justice,
the protection afforded by the privilege of attorney and client is not
essential to due process of law. The privilege might be abolished and
justice still be done. Yet, in the opposing scale of the balance, there
are not the same vital interests of the state in internal security, but
only a general social interest in the security of property and contract
and protection of the person from careless misconduct.391
If this suggestion is correct, what it means is that in the balancing
process, the claim of privilege is as much entitled to protection on the
one level as on the other. But, of course, outside the area of the
personal relationships which the policy behind the privileges is designed
to protect, the privilege should not continue to exist. The social inter-
est in accurate fact-finding then becomes the paramount value. Hence,
388. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
389. See, however, the recent case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (over-
ruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 [1949]), decided since the above words were
written, wherein it was held that the exclusionary rule, as a part of the constitutional
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment, extends to evidence obtained by state officers
and offered in state tribunals. This extension of the effective scope of this privilege
is illustrative of the growing vitality of the dignity principle in the constitutional
area (as heretofore discussed by the writer). See Day & Berkman, Search and
Seizure and the Exclusionary Rule: A Re-Examination in the Wake of Mapp v.
Ohio, 13 W. REs. L. Rv. 56 (1961).
390. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
391. Symposium-The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations,
the Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. Rev. 235, 258 (1961),
recognizes that the privilege does not rise to constitutional dignity in civil cases but
seems to think that it does in criminal cases, as a facet of the right to counsel. (Cases
cited therein notes 115-17.)
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the privilege should not extend to the protection of business and prop-
erty relations where these can be separated from close personal rela-
tions; and in denying the privilege here, business and property rights
are actually rendered more secure. This is only superficially paradoxical
because it is obvious on reflection that business and property are ren-
dered secure by accurate fact-finding; whereas, interests of personality
(and social institutions such as the family and the church) might have
fundamental values undermined by the compulsory disclosure of con-
fidential matters which such higher accuracy in fact-finding would
require.3 92
As has been said, the justification for this proposed shift in the
area of protection of confidential relations is the growth of a new and
higher measure of values in the twentieth century jurisprudence. Nor
is this thesis something new or startling. Actually, the rationale of the
privilege has changed once previously, and there is no reason why it
should not change again, or take a more comprehensive point of view,
to meet new needs as we proceed in new paths of the law. As Holmes
has said: "The law is always approaching, and never reaching con-
sistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and
it always retains old ones from history at the other, which have not
yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent
only when it ceases to grow. ' '39 3 Thus, it is proper that the rationale of
a principle should change with the changed conditions of society, and
this in turn will bring changes in the substantive rules which were
designed to effectuate underlying principles.
The personal privileges are valuable and should be retained; but
inasmuch as they interfere with the important function of fact-finding,
they must not be made into too broad rules and must not be given
mechanical application in new situations for which they were not
originally intended. If extended to new situations, the extension should
be based upon the determination that the principle underlying the rules
should properly control in such extended area. The rules of law should
always be construed to effectuate their purpose. Hence, in the case of
the attorney-client privilege, the existing doctrines of waiver and eaves-
dropping should be re-examined to determine whether they are con-
sistent with the policy on which the privilege now rests and if they
are internally consistent with each other. The former should be limited
in scope to eliminate technicalities that are inconsistent with the spirit
392. This is a general value judgment, and one can only say that it might happen
in a particular case. A good illustration of the potential damage to which a domestic
situation is vulnerable will be found in highly dramatic form in the play La Robe
Rouge, by Brieux, of the French Academy. This drama is contained in Ciiiwe CON-
TEMPORARY DRAMATISTS 471 (Dickinson ed. 1915).
393. HOLMES, TnE COMMON LAw 36 (1881). 69
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of the law of privilege. The latter should be abolished as being incon-
sistent with the spirit of a free society - a larger matrix of which the
privilege is only a tangible facet. As a rule of law, the eavesdropping
exception tends to promote antisocial and dishonorable actions, and
when carried on by the state officials, such conduct is reminiscent of
the methods of the police state and the gestapo. This rule cannot right-
fully claim recognition in our law of privilege today. The privilege
should not be held to apply, however, when it would countermand the
otherwise imperative duty of counsel to come forward and vindicate the
innocence of a living person erroneously convicted (or accused) of a
crime. Here, a higher personal value is weighed in the opposing balance
(on the side of evidence). The privilege should not be expanded
through a process of reasoning based on inapplicable analogies drawn
from other areas of the law - analogies which should have no bearing
on rules the justification of which must be founded upon principles
having their origin in the concept of human dignity and inviolate
personality.
For example, the scope of the privilege in the area of personal
relations has no rational connection with the fictions of agency theory
and should not be made to bear this load, but rather should be re-
stricted to the narrower limits of the policy to be effectuated, to wit:
the facility of the client and the attorney in communicating with each
other. Hence, the communications of source agents and managerial
agents should be eliminated from the protection of the privilege. The
privilege should not extend to that artificial entity the corporation,
more especially to house counsel, to automobile casualty insurance
firms representing defendants, and to governmental bodies. In each
instance, the opposing interests should be weighed in the balance, and
here such interests (evidence) must prevail. Moreover, these healthy
restrictions will remove the privilege from those areas of the law where
it detracts most from accurate fact-finding. This will also serve the
purpose of keeping the rules of evidence simple and easy to apply, in
accordance with the Thayer principle. 94 Furthermore, it will aid im-
measurably in the achievement of a system of open discovery, which is
of great importance to the litigation process of our day.
To recapitulate as to the other personal privileges: The physician-
patient privilege should be recognized generally; interpreted liberally
to effectuate its purpose, with proper recognition of the doctrine of
waiver and contract provisions in insurance policies when necessary to
prevent fraud; it should be extended to cover psychiatrists and psycholo-
394. TIHAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 529 (1898). See also
Morgan and Maguire, op. cit. note 207 at 910.
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gists, thus protecting the dignity and privacy of the individual in the
vital area of mental health. The priest and penitent privilege should
be preserved and liberally interpreted to effectuate the principle which
it was designed to protect, to wit: freedom of conscience or religion.
The husband and wife privilege should be preserved to protect the
institution of the family, as to testimony by one spouse against the
other during marriage. The related privilege of confidential communi-
cations of spouses should be preserved to protect the right of privacy
in what is perhaps the most intimate of personal relationships, even
when that relationship no longer exists, though here a qualified privi-
lege, to be terminated when the court finds that the interests of justice
outweigh the advantages of privacy to the holder of the privilege,
might be a satisfactory solution. Elsewhere, the urgent need for ac-
curacy in fact-finding should be the controlling principle. This need is
so great that the privileges themselves should not be allowed to exist
in perpetuity, but should be terminated upon the death of the holder.
This would be in accordance with the purpose of holding the privileges
strictly within the limits of the policy which they exist to effectuate.
The only exception would be that of priest and penitent, where the
full protection of the principle of religious freedom would require con-
tinuation of the privilege even after the death of the communicant.
In new areas of the law and in the application of settled rules in
new contexts, first principles must be constantly re-examined and made
to stand the test of society's current needs and values. "New occasions
teach new duties, ' 3 95 and the law must constantly adjust itself to the
pressing needs of our ever-changing and complex society. Modern
science has come to think of reality itself as only a series of tentative
hypotheses to be used as working tools and then discarded as new light
appears, new insights are begotten. 96 The criticisms contained in this
paper are the result of ideas which came to the writer only after he
had made a laborious survey of the subject and had endeavored to
decide whether the privileges or any of them were worth preserving
and if so to what extent. He reached the conclusion which Lord
Erskine once held applicable to the whole body of principles of evidence,
to wit: that "they are founded in the charities of religion - in the phil-
osophy of nature - in the truths of history - and in the experience
of common life." '397 The writer would add, however, that they are
395. From The Present Crisis, a poem by James Russell Lowell.
396. See generally POLANyI, TH- LoGIc o' LIBERTY (1951).
397. As quoted with approval in the first edition of GRtENLXAF ON EVIDENCX§ 584 (1842). The writer strongly disagrees with Lord Erskine but believes that the
statement would be a reasonable one in relation to the personal privileges in the face
to face situation.
As to attitudes toward the system of evidence generally, compare the above
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ultimately based on twentieth century humanitarian ideals. The writer
realizes that the notions indicated with reference to curtailment will be
startling to the organized bar, not because they are new and novel -
for they are not - but rather because they have not yet permeated the
popular legal thought. On the other hand, the proposed restrictions on
the privileges will not be adequate to satisfy those legal reformers who
are strongly in opposition to the privileges. He hopes, nevertheless,
that this critique will be accepted in the spirit in which it is made, as
an effort to improve our judicial process, and that others will express
their opinions, so that ferment may be had to catalyze progress.
In summation, the thesis of this paper is that the attorney-client
privilege should not be disdained and abolished but rather should be
understood and properly applied only in the area of the personal rela-
tionship - which alone was the area of its application in the setting
in which it developed in Elizabethian society, when compulsory testi-
mony was first introduced into our adversary system of litigation -
and that the justification for the privilege in twentieth century juris-
prudence is the developing concept of human dignity. He would also
add that the privileges when properly limited can be subsumed under
the jural postulate of fair procedures.
In setting forth these views, the writer claims no infallibility and
above all no finality. Could we but have omniscience, we might be more
precise, might plumb our sights down to the "depth of being, the reality
behind the veil."39 Hence, these views are subject to both revision and
correction. Nevertheless, the writer presently concludes that in our
culture, the personal privileges tip the scales. We wish that they were
unnecessary, and we hope that in time this may come to be true. But
though the ideal is a thing to be strived for, it must be the ideal of the
here and now, not some far off utopia. And in the present stage of
man's social development, the privileges wear the badge of social worth
- not primarily as a concession to man's insecurity, but rather as a
recognition of man's moral and spiritual integrity by and toward his
fellow man. Viewed thus, the personal privileges constitute a positive
achievement, a mark of the maturity of society, rather than a con-
cession to individual human weakness. It is therefore a mark of
civilization that they should be preserved. In the far-off utopian vision
of the future, "9' ethical notions might again become the rule of conduct,
as quoted in A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Fcasibility of Developing
Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal District Courts, by the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 30
F.R.D. 73, 108-10 (1962).
398. CARDOZO, PARADOXES or LEGAL SCIENCE 134 (1928).
399. See generally SLIDENB31H¢, POsT-HisTORIC MAN (1950).
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human nature might occupy a higher plateau, and the utterly secure
might need no privilege for the whole truth in a nobler world. By that
time, law and procedure might be very different things themselves. But
for our times, it has been well said, "Complete candor to anyone but
ourselves is a virtue that belongs to the saints, to the secure, and to
the very courageous. "400 Hence, we should be permitted to remain silent
in our secure privacy until officially called upon to speak. Then we
should be permitted to tell our little story at our own gait and in our
own fashion, perhaps even at the risk that a little bit may be omitted
or deliberately colored here and there. °1 Justice consists in the ordering
of an ideal relation among men. Truth is but one of the components
of justice, though it is an important one. Freedom," 2 privacy, security,
euphoria are others.40 Perhaps they all constitute dignity." 4 Justice
would be lacking an important element should we deny fair considera-
tion to the claim of each. 40 5
400. Curtis, op. cit. note 161 at 8; and see text at note 161.
401. Ibid.
402. The delicate balance between freedom and restraint, sometime described as
"responsibility," would be a preferable term. Here, however, the individual element
of choice enters into it in a larger degree.
403. The loyalty and honor of the attorney are important factors, but they are
not included as such because they directly involve the feelings of the lawyer only.
They indirectly contribute to the client's sense of privacy and security, probably to
his sense of euphoria.
404. See text following note 181 ante; see also op. cit. note 149, 262 at 282 n. 68.
405. Cf. generally Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69
HARV. L. Riv. 683 (1956).
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